

VOL. XV. No. 4

OCTOBER, AUTUMN, 1934

THE PERSONALIST



A QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION AND
LITERATURE



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Published by

THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSITY PARK - LOS ANGELES - CALIFORNIA

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Entered as second-class matter July 3, 1933, at P.O. at L.A., under act of March 3, 1879

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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

BABSONIAN RELIGION

¶ The world's leading statistician, called in to diagnose the shortcomings of the church and of our modern culture, addressed a great gathering of ecclesiastical leaders recently, to the effect that for the renovation of church and society they should cease counting dollars and begin to count heads.

¶ The belatedness of this suggestion is exceeded only by its futility.

¶ In the first place, we have already been engaged for at least fifty years in the good old American game of counting noses, which occupation has been greatly accelerated of late by the aforesaid statistician.

That minister has been counted the greatest success who could draw the largest houses.

¶ The result has been that the emphasis has shifted from worship and examination of soul to entertainment. This has led to all sorts of bizarre exhibitions from the pulpit quite out of keeping with the spirit of worship. Sometimes the announced titles of sermons are like the salacious titles chosen for the movies, even more striking than the presentation, as when some thirty-five years ago one of the leaders of the new movement announced on the visit of Colonel Ingersoll to Boston that he would preach

from the theme, "Will the Bible or Bob build a bigger, better and busier Boston?"

¶ The effect upon the church-goer has been equally disastrous in that in many instances it has come about that he will attend church only when and where he is entertained, and the church is put on the basis of competitor with other places of entertainment.

¶ The charge of futility in the advice given may be even more difficult for the average belief, for are we not continually told that "a million people cannot be wrong?" We have an idea that majorities can justify any evil practice even though we will not admit it in such cases as child labor, pure food and drugs (if we are the sellers of these articles), the legality of usury, censorship of pictures, or Prohibition, or in other cases where the moral welfare of society is involved.

¶ For this reason we must be excused if we fail to grow enthusiastic over congregation-counting as the means to the Millenium.

¶ The life of the church and of society is built primarily upon or grows out of the vitality of faith, faith in the seemingly impossible, confidence in the power, the goodness and the greatness of God, the effectiveness and reality of spiritual values and their eternal authority.

¶ There are too many church programs that make no draft upon these principles of faith. A congregation made up of a spiritual leader and one earnest soul is all that may be needed to start a spiritual revolution and bring a new social and religious day. In fact, such a congregation may be smaller than that, and consist only of one earnest soul and God.

¶ The modern world has been bewitched and betrayed by its concern over numbers. What it most needs is life. We forget that the original Christian church consisted of twelve members and a minister. In the statistics of the congregation there was little significance, for some of them turned out of little account and one was a traitor. Had there been nothing there but numbers we should never have heard of them.

¶ The important thing was the life that was in them and their conviction regarding it. Out of this tiny and vital germ came the conquering power of the early church, and out of such must arise the significance of any church.

R. T. F.

The Personalist

TWO PLUS TWO EQUAL FIVE

By THE EDITOR

INDIVIDUALISM has become the special expression of the genius of the West. It has invaded the theory of the State, replacing the autocracies of Europe with democracies, or at least with what were thought to be democracies. It began by placing a new emphasis on the education of the individual, and erected the Universities. It became the ruling idea in scientific method, supplanting deduction by induction. The search for the individual, for the unit of society, for the unit of matter, has turned the eyes of the western world toward a never-ending, unsatisfying analysis as the sole method of knowledge.

So far, western civilization has not had the patience nor the power to find the solution of its conflict, but it feels that with either of these principles it has come to the end of its tether. The principle of authority has long been dead and superseded in the minds of all advanced thinkers. Only now are we beginning to understand the equal futility of what has been termed "a rugged individualism"—the hope, by a final analysis which uncovers the smallest entity, to solve all our problems, scientific, social, or political. This vast disillusionment and disappointment is the source of the present crisis.

I.

The Mathematical Concept of Society

The handmaid of this individualistic analysis, which sought to reduce the units of reality to ever-decreasing parts, and which emphasized solely the individualism of society, was, of course, the mathematical method. The mathematical method may be called the chief obsession of our day.

Some future generation, looking back on this, will marvel at the absurd extent to which the present world has been seized by the madness of numbers. Ours might properly be called the age of statistics. If we have these we consider ourselves in possession of the essential facts concerning anything in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth. We swallow our statistics whole, nor stay for an interpretation. This shows that we are more impressed with number than with meaning. Quantity has become the slogan of the hour—quantity production. We judge the value of political expedients by the number of votes they can muster, the condition of society by the number of its living rooms per family, the success of the church by the number of its adherents, and of a factory by the number of cheap and inartistic units it can produce. The one thing we seem utterly to have forgotten is the ancient biblical contempt for number, where it is written that “one shall chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight.”

The result is a mobocracy. One dare not stand apart from the evil practices of the multitude with anything like independence and integrity. What “everybody” is said to be doing is accorded a divine sanction. We grade the adeptness of students by a point-index, determine their fitness for a degree or honors with a perfect assurance of our

decimals, and think to define intelligence itself by an I. Q. It is little to be wondered at under these conditions that our mentors decided the American people were on the average some twelve years of age in mentality, to the smug satisfaction of the whole English nation.

The mathematical obsession, which has been of value in scientific discovery, has yet led to curious results in many fields. It has been quite unattended by any will or capacity for logical criticism or critical examination of alleged results. Without mathematics we have thought there was neither measure of progress nor, indeed, any progress. Even the most precious, while at the same time the most evasive, values have been made to bear the yoke of point-index measurements to give us assurance of their reality. Love has been compelled to write its own psychological graphs, and integrity to record itself on a lie-detector. The pathos of such operations is our credulous faith in the results, our assurance of scientific exactitude. We have been led, however, to distrust any reality which will not yield to our demand for quantitative measurement. We remain blind to the fact that in getting the point-index the reality has often utterly escaped us. We judge our corn by the number of husks.

The effect of this strange obsession has been disastrous in the realm of human freedom, which embraces the mental, the moral, the æsthetic, and the religious values. There has been too much of a tendency to carry the doctrine of percentages into this territory, to the destruction of ideals. The matter of intent is quite overlooked in moral values, as if one really could be ninety-eight per cent honest; or mental qualities could be microscopically determined by a decimal point; or a work of art could be fifty per cent good or bad;

or as if religion demanded less than the devotion of the whole man. The result has been misleading and corruptive of all ideals of value.

Were we to stop here we can conceive of some members of society accepting our strictures upon the mathematical method with complacency. What may not be agreeable is the assertion that we have worked under a like delusion in business. We have considered the most prosperous period that in which the graphs of transactions ran highest, and these pages of graphs have become our veneration and our Bible. We have never thought to question the moral content of this seeming prosperity, nor to inquire whether the whole structure we were building rested on the only secure bases of integrity, social justice, and advancing civilization. Had these been included, we should have been inevitably warned of the approaching collapse, while our graphs went on predicting prosperity. We do not see it yet, but the absence of these moral elements which we considered negligible induced the whirlwind.

The general effect has been to transfer the emphasis from the things most worth while and to place it upon what should be the incidentals in civilization; to exalt quantity into the true place of quality to the deterioration of the whole social order. The froth of a quantity-obsessed society has come to be looked upon as the most important, though the principle has been to get without giving and to enjoy without social responsibility. The servants of higher ideals in the world of art, literature, education, and religion have been relegated to the rear of the procession, or hated, stigmatized, neglected, and crucified. We may as well recognize that our world of affluence and opulence has meant stultifying poverty for the multitude and the smothering of

artistic and religious genius which had in its gift the regeneration of society.

II.

A Static Versus a Living Society

Any world that can be made to yield results to a mathematical method must be taken in cross-section. It demands an Eleatic God or an Omnipotent Moses to command its sea to stand still while its picture is being taken. Then we have the best possible of worlds for the mathematician, and the quantitative method reaches its highest efficiency. Zeno's arrow poises in flight that we may construct a geometrical graph, and Achilles and the Tortoise loiter paralyzed in a point-to-point correspondence. What is wrong with this complete and perfect picture of the scientific world? The answer is, about everything. For the chief characteristic of our world is not death but life, not changelessness but change. Point-index systems can deal only with fixed points. But in the universe there are no fixed points. We have considered the cosmic order as wholly quantitative, when the more important phase of its existence for intelligent beings has been that it is qualitative, and, because qualitative, therefore living. This is the undoubted reason that there has been no general application of scientific method to the needs of society. We have fostered a static condition of society quite unequipped for change: a society smugly content, from lowest to highest, with its statistics, those shadows of reality, and its *status quo*. All the organizations of present society have been built upon this static foundation as if life could teach us nothing.

Thus by credos, declarations, and constitutions we have laid the dead hand upon future progress, trusting only ourselves for the direct illumination of omniscient wisdom.

Then we have died grasping the static charters of society and commanding our offspring to keep them inviolate, nor to be moved by any new ideas in a living and changing world. The apparent advances of education have been merely a jump from an unrelenting and hidebound classicism to an equally unrelenting and hidebound anti-classicism in the interests of a "practical," which means an artisan, education. In religion we have given over the infallible and unchangeable credo for an equally weak and unintelligible absence of conviction. Yet neither education nor religion has been so socially belated as our theories of economics, politics, and society. Why is the situation so much worse than in the past of history? The answer must be found in our unwillingness to apply living and changing concepts to a living and changing world. The increase of material comforts, which makes the domicile of the worker outvie the castles of Queen Elizabeth; instantaneous world communication; the conquest of space; the universal inter-relation of international economics—these constitute a physical revolution in our living economy. Upon our formulated and static theories they have put a practical stress and strain for which prevailing concepts were all inadequate. The new wine will burst the old wineskins, and an attempt to mend and utilize the old methods and watchwords is sewing patches of new cloth on rotten and outworn garments. Before the ink of our latest statistics is dry, new conditions confront us for which we are unprepared because we possess only the wisdom of the backward look and none of that insight into the future which comes in eyes morally clean and is the vision of the pure in heart. It is this higher vision and insight which alone can meet the demands of life in a cramped and cabined world, where any disease anywhere stalks on every doorstep, and any en-

trenched wrong or injustice anywhere threatens the entire world with revolution. We are living in a world rendered by mathematicians so small that we are lost unless we can achieve something more than mathematics, namely, goodwill. Good-will, love, alone can keep open the arteries of a living world and provide living solutions for questions of the hour.

III.

Two Plus Two Equal Five

Both Dostoievsky and Chekhov have made the suggestion that there is no progress in human society until in some fashion two plus two begin to equal more than four. It is the disease of our civilization to think it can make progress by neglecting the imponderables. We have deemed it hard-headed sanity and reason to go on rather boastfully repeating that two plus two always and under all conditions equal just four. Anyone who dared to question that maxim had his sanity doubted or was looked upon as an enemy of society. However, this was the latent truth in the doctrine of evolution, that foundling child of science which has grown up into a living embarrassment. This is the truth latent in the doctrine of Emergence, that swan song of materialism which hopes to cover with a question-begging word the fact that in the realm of biology intrusive novelties not infrequently extort from us confessions that two plus two may equal five.

The principle is not a new one, and is one of the commonest experiences of life. Only our mathematical-mindedness, our blind devotion to a single method of observation, could have hid from us this significance. We rationalize our world into a neat two-plus-two which is at best hypothesis, and when some fact arises that does not fit into our

scheme, we deny the fact rather than the hypothesis. As one writer recently stated it:

It is true, no doubt, that most of the great generalizations of science, such, for instance, as the Law of Gravitation and the first two Laws of Thermodynamics, are so solidly established that the discovery of any contradictory fact is scarcely conceivable. Any such alleged discovery would suggest only error or illusion on the part of the discoverer.¹

From this he goes on to affirm the absolute certainty of practically all those sureties which have been exploded in physics in the past few years under the verification of Relativity, the Principle of Uncertainty, Atomic activity, and the rest. This is what comes of the assurance that two plus two equal absolutely and eternally nothing but four. While the principle has helped us to many a valuable approximation, it has stood directly in the way of the discovery of new truth and has settled us down to a slumber as deep as any experienced by the dogmatic theologians. But whatever verity two plus two may have in the world of strict mathematics, where it belongs and beyond which it should not dogmatically stray, it has only a subordinate place in dealing with a living, moving universe. This is the secret of the resort to non-Euclidian geometry and the array of new inventions such as quanta, and the corpuscular-wave-theory of light, which indicate that there are facts which two plus two cannot take into account.

The situation becomes infinitely perilous for any two-plus-two philosophy, however, when we come into the realm of human relations, where the measure of contingency or freedom is increased a thousand-fold. In this realm, if two-plus-two ever equal four, and not more nor less, we ought to look with something like Mr. Elliot's suspicion on the

¹ Hugh Elliot: *Modern Science and Materialism*, Longmans, Green & Co., N. Y. 1927. p. 8.

result. When will our statistical wise-acres ever learn that the mere multiplication of hands in a factory will not necessarily increase by equal rates the output? When will we also see that certain humanitarian considerations must enter both into quality and quantity? It is just the introduction of these human imponderables that makes the difference between failure and success, between barbarism and civilization, between death and life.

What Western Culture is at this moment in most need of is attention to the imponderables. Our faith has been in mathematics, that two plus two made the always and everywhere four, and that because it did, we could neglect justice and mercy and righteousness. Thus, too, we vainly think that two plus two warships add up to peace and security, and that if we have that it matters not whether we live in love and charity with our neighbors. As our cities have grown into swarming hives, and all our thinking has been commercialized, the old amenities between neighbor and neighbor have drifted out; yet these were the imponderables that held society together and stayed the hand of revolution. Now we endeavor frantically to organize our charity so as to make it as impersonal as possible, with the result of the very destruction of the intangible self-respect and love, which has reduced it in most cases to a species of pauperizing graft.

On the other hand, when two men plus two men come to see eye to eye in a common cause—a cause so right as to command faith and growing respect—then two plus two begins to equal anything better than four which the cause commands. Right here must lie the regeneration of society. The individual must seek his own self-realization in cooperation with his fellows. It is only so that society can get

forward, and the individual can be more than a mathematical integer. We have socially dreamed we could work as integers. Our concept has been in line with our universal worship of numbers.

While there is this undue veneration of numbers, there is an equal stressing of individual "rights." Since the stress is on individuality rather than quality, everyone has "rights" without obligation to family, fellows, or society at large. There is so far an utter failure to apply the doctrine of relativity to society. Were we to do it we should see that the individual is nothing apart from his relations. His relations make him while he is making them. There can be no realization of his own highest individuality except through recognition of and cooperation with that set of relationships of which he is a part. This new concept of society has yet to capture the social imagination.

For we are now entering upon a new world of space-time concepts, and that foretells a new concept of society. In the old world, quantities, ever quantities, were the seeming realities. In the new we discover that the notions of quantity, of space and time, are due to the intensity of activity. Yet mere activity as space-filling quality is meaningless. Things acquire their qualities from the possession of values. It is not their uniqueness but their cooperation with other entities to some end that constitutes their importance and value. The change of concept is as if we were to leave off counting heads and were to begin to investigate what is in them.

THE RELIGIOUS PRAGMATISM OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE (1847-1910)

EDWARD T. RAMSDELL

Since the publication of the first comprehensive bibliography of the writings of Borden Parker Bowne in 1929,¹ apparently no attempt has been made to deal with the problem of Bowne's religious pragmatism. The problem is presented by the parallel occurrence in his work of both rationalistic and pragmatic types of method. As a consequence of this parallel occurrence, Bowne has been variously claimed, since his death in 1910, as both rationalist and pragmatist. It is now clear, however, that conservative students of his philosophy have, in general, underestimated the importance of the pragmatic elements by subsuming them under his rationalism, and that more radical students, though recognizing the importance of the pragmatism, have failed to show its relation to his rationalism.

With Bowne's writings as a whole before us, we are in a position to distinguish and define, in a way not heretofore possible, the pragmatic elements in his epistemology and philosophical method. It is this that constitutes the object of the present paper. A second paper will consider the problem of the relationship of these pragmatic elements to

¹ This bibliography was the work of Professor Carroll D. W. Hildebrand, of De Pauw University, and was published as an appendix to Bishop Francis J. McConnell's *Borden Parker Bowne* (N. Y.: Abingdon Press, 1929, pp. 282-286). The bibliography includes nearly one hundred and fifty items: books, articles, reviews and sermons. One important addition, at least, however, should be made to Professor Hildebrand's bibliography as here published, namely, the article: "The Logic of Religious Belief," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, 66 (1884), 641-665. It should also be noted that two of the articles listed in the bibliography are not by Bowne, but rather are reviews of his books by Professor Benjamin N. Martin, namely: *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 56 (1874), 510-514; and *Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 57 (1875), 97-114.

Bowne's rationalism, and a third paper will deal with their sources.

By rationalism we shall here understand any method or methods that make reason, as the logical understanding, the final standard and arbiter of all philosophical questions. Rationalism may proceed deductively, after the manner of Descartes and Herbart, or it may proceed empirically, gathering the facts of experience and attempting their ultimate theoretical explanation under the standards of consistency and coherence. The distinguishing mark of rationalism is its ultimate appeal to reason for its criteria of truth. By pragmatism, on the other hand, we shall understand those methods which make various extra-rational factors the final standards of philosophy, such as fruitfulness or favorable results, or the satisfaction of our human interests and feelings. Such pragmatism is, of course, of the humanistic type rather than of the scientific, but it is the pragmatism with which we are concerned in the writings of Bowne.

The pragmatism of Bowne sprang almost exclusively from his interest in religion. The metaphysical groundwork of religion could indeed be established by rationalistic method, but the distinctively religious concepts, on his view, could not be so established. Rationalism provides a sufficient basis, therefore, for the unity, intelligence and free causality of the world-ground. But the concepts of the love and goodness of God, prayer and immortality require some other ground for their affirmation. We can hold to them only because of our faith in the ideal, and our faith in the reality of the ideal is established alone by practical considerations, by the energy of life itself. In his *Theism* Bowne explains:

God is seen to be that without which our ideals collapse or are made unattainable, and the springs of action are broken.

Hence the existence of God is affirmed not on speculative or theoretical grounds, but because of the needs of the practical life. This has often been called the moral argument for the divine existence; a better name would be the practical argument.²

Religious belief, therefore, is to be justified primarily on pragmatic grounds. We have here, then, the line of division through the system of Bowne's thought. His viewpoint combines at once that of the metaphysical rationalist and that of the religious pragmatist.

In distinguishing the pragmatic elements in Bowne's epistemological theory and method, we may begin with his view of the nature of the mind. From the publication of the *Studies in Theism* in 1879 to the end of his work, he described the mind as an organic whole of vital interests and feelings which outline and control our mental development and determine our fundamental beliefs. Driven by his own religious interest, Bowne joined in the revolt against an over-intellectualism. Not only is the mind not to be thought of as primarily intellect, but the logical intellect is not even to be credited with a controlling place in the mind. It is not logic, but our interests and feelings that determine our fundamental beliefs.

Characteristic of these pragmatic, anti-intellectualist descriptions of the mind are these:

Mental activity runs in lines determined by our fundamental interests, and all our theories are adjusted to them.³

The mind is not a disinterested logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold interests and tendencies. These outline its development, and furnish the driving power.⁴

The driving and directing force of the mind lies in its living interests, and not in the discursive faculty. The principles

² *Theism* (N. Y.: American Book Co., 1902), p. 291.

³ *Concerning the Christian Consciousness, Independent*, 37 (Jan. 8, 1885), 35.

⁴ *Philosophy of Theism* (N. Y.: Harper, 1887), p. 19.

of mental movement are to be sought, not in logic, but in life. . . . There is no department of belief into which subjective interests do not enter as controlling.⁵

Such descriptions as these are not casual or incidental in Bowne, but occur throughout the course of his religious writings.

A second pragmatic element is found in Bowne's use of the criterion of interest-satisfaction. Anything which satisfies the fundamental interests or subjective needs of the mind may be regarded as true. As we have now seen, Bowne thought of the mind as an organic whole of manifold interests and tendencies. These interests include the intellectual, the moral, the æsthetic, and the religious. Each represents a basic "subjective" need of the mind. These needs are satisfied through certain postulates which rise out of them. The intellectual need requires our belief in the intelligibility and rationality of the universe; the æsthetic need requires our belief in the reality of ideal beauty; the moral need requires our belief in the moral government of the world; and the religious need requires our belief in the reality of God as the inclusive ideal. These beliefs, or postulates, cannot be proved, and Bowne saw no adequate rationalistic justification for them. We can accept them as valid, therefore, only on the pragmatic grounds that they satisfy the fundamental needs of the mind out of which they grow.

In its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of *modus vivendi* with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities.⁶

⁵ *The Logic of Religious Belief*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 66 (1884), 660.

⁶ *Phil. of Theism*, pp. 13-14.

Primarily, all of these assumptions are but the projection upon the universe of the demands and interests of our total nature.⁷

In his defense of the religious postulate, Bowne reaches beyond a strictly religious pragmatism. If the postulates of morality and religion are subjective, he argues, at least they are no more subjective than those of science, for all fundamental postulates rest, in the final analysis, simply upon their satisfaction of human interests. The scientist assumes the intelligibility and uniformity of the natural world, but "this is a tremendous assumption, based only on his subjective needs."⁸

If the instinctive affirmations of the mind are accepted in default of proof in the field of sense-perception, there seems to be no good reason why similar affirmations should be rejected in the field of morals and religion.⁹

Without yet attempting a critique of Bowne's religious pragmatism, it may be pointed out that at this point, in his treatment of the scientific postulates, he is invading the field which, by his own definition, should be left to rationalistic method. To the rationalist the cognitive need of the mind may indeed account for the origin of the postulate that the world is intelligible, but only reason can establish the rational justification of the assumption on the ground that it yields the most reasonable, that is, the most consistent and coherent, view of experience. To the thorough-going rationalist, of course, the moral and religious postulates find their warrant in the same way and not in any fact of basic interest-satisfactions.

From the criterion of interest-satisfaction Bowne formulated the fundamental method of his religious writings.

⁷ Loc. cit., *Independent*, 37 (Jan. 8, 1885), 35.

⁸ *Studies in Theism* (N. Y.: Phillips & Hunt, 1880, 2nd ed.), 70.

⁹ Loc. cit., *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 66 (1884), 655-656.

It is essentially the method which James later called that of the "will to believe." As early as 1887 Bowne wrote:

There is an element of faith and volition latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove, we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides.¹⁰

Bowne believed to find authority for this method in Kant, who, he writes:

claimed to have shown that, by way of speculation, neither proof nor disproof is possible; and in this balance of the speculative reason practical interests may be allowed to turn the scale.¹¹

Bowne's formal statement of the method appeared for the first time in 1884. It is this:

Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of positive disproof.¹²

Because Bowne held, of course, that rational proof or disproof of ultimate religious beliefs is impossible, this statement of method remains entirely pragmatic.

Bowne's use of the criterion of workability or results constitutes a third pragmatic element. As early as 1879 he used this criterion in the *Studies in Theism*. For example,

We conclude . . . that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do not admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided always that it works well.¹³

In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on results.¹⁴

Again, in one of the last articles that he wrote, shortly before his death in 1910, he speaks of what he calls the "essential beliefs" of the mind:

¹⁰ *Phil. of Theism*, p. iii.

¹¹ *Phil. of Theism*, p. 242.

¹² *Loc. cit.*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 66 (1884), 652.

¹³ *Studies in Theism*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

They are the principles by which men live, and without which they cannot live their best life. And the proof of such beliefs rests entirely on the energy of the life they express, and on their power to further that life in practice. They meet our mental needs and they work well in life. This is the pragmatic test of truth, and for concrete truth there is no deeper or surer test than this.¹⁵

Further indication that Bowne employed the results-criterion in full consciousness of it as a pragmatic instrument is found in the volume *Kant and Spencer*, published posthumously. He writes:

Thought has become pragmatic, especially in ethical and religious fields, and we are very little concerned at speculative inadequacy, provided a doctrine works well in practice and enriches and furthers life.¹⁶

Another form in which the results-criterion appears is found in the phrase "practical absurdity," as, for example: "The test of concrete truth and error is practical absurdity."¹⁷ Here the criterion is given a negative form.

A fourth pragmatic element is the criterion of survival, used a number of times, although in a more incidental way than the other elements. Characteristic of this use is the statement, referring to conflicting beliefs: "More and more history itself becomes the argument, and the survival of the fittest the judge."¹⁸ And again,

If there be others with a different set of fundamental sympathies and interests, and no mediation is possible, history and the survival of the fittest must decide between them.¹⁹

And further, speaking of the anti-religious views of the world, Bowne affirms:

¹⁵ *Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation*, *Hibbert Journal*, 8 (1909-10), 892.

¹⁶ *Kant and Spencer* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), p. 209.

¹⁷ *Theism*, p. 25.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 66 (1884), 665.

¹⁹ *Cardinal Newman and Science*, *Independent*, 42 (1890), 1401.

These views have not been great enough to command the faith or stir the hearts of men. In this fact the survival of the fittest, as the supreme court for considering the matter, hands down a final decision.²⁰

Bowne's view of reason as instrumental with respect to the fundamental interests of the mind constitutes a fifth pragmatic element in his thought. The following is a characteristic statement of the view:

Our feelings and interests are the deepest thing in us. They furnish the great impulses to action, and they also outline its direction. . . . Man can interest himself in truth, in righteousness, in beauty, in a great variety of ideal aims, which thus become the norms and guides of his action. For these basal interests, the intellect is simply instrumental.²¹

And in speaking of the postulates or assumptions which grow out of the basic interests of the mind, Bowne writes:

What, now, is the function of logic with regard to these postulates? Plainly not to prove them, but to bring them and their implications out into clear consciousness, and to keep them from losing their way.²²

It is clear, therefore, that in Bowne's view these fundamental interests of the mind stand in their own right, independent of any possible justification by reason. Indeed, reason is to be regarded as instrumental to these interests, helping to articulate and clarify them and to bring them into harmony with one another. This is not to deny that intellect has "full rights"²³ of its own, but it is to affirm that these rights are restricted to the fields of logic and metaphysics.

One additional pragmatic element is to be distinguished in Bowne's thought, namely, his view of truth. Bowne sometimes uses the term truth in the restricted sense of

²⁰ *The Essence of Religion* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910), p. 298.

²¹ *Introduction to Psychological Theory* (N. Y.: Harper, 1866), pp. 217-218.

²² *Phil. of Theism*, pp. 25-26.

²³ See *Hibbert Journal*, 8 (1909-10), 892.

meaning simply the *a priori* principles of reason. So defined, truth is, on his view, absolute.²⁴ Concrete truth, or truth concerning the external world, on the other hand, means the validity of our thought for the external thing.²⁵ And here the conception has a strong pragmatic tone. The truth of any theory may be rationally presumed, for example, if its results are favorable to human life. Referring to the criterion of results as used by certain "materialists," Bowne says:

This standard is simply results. Those thoughts and views are true which work well; and those are false which work ill. In a rational system such a test would be valid; but the materialist has no such system.²⁶

Bowne, of course, thought of his own philosophy as a "rational system."

For Bowne truth was through and through teleological. There is no truth that is not in some measure purposive. Upon this view, it was natural to assume that truth will show itself in fruitful results. In an article written in 1884, after affirming the pernicious influence of atheistic beliefs and the beneficial influence of theistic beliefs, he wrote:

If, now, this is no ground for believing them (i. e., the theistic beliefs), we are under the disagreeable necessity of admitting that a true belief may be paralyzing and pernicious, while a false belief may be necessary to our best development.²⁷

Perhaps the clearest statement of this conception of truth is to be found in one of the last articles that Bowne wrote. Referring to the basic beliefs of life, he explains:

²⁴ *Metaphysics—A Study in First Principles* (N. Y.: Harper, 1882), p. 488.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁶ *Studies in Theism*, p. 115.

²⁷ *Loc. cit.*, *Meth. Quart. Rev.*, 66 (1884), 654.

They meet our mental needs and they work well in life. This is the pragmatic test of truth, and for concrete truth there is no deeper or surer test than this. Indeed theory of knowledge implicitly assumes this test. If we are theists, we can hardly believe that the truth will work mischief. If we are evolutionists and believers in natural selection, we must equally believe that these evolved beliefs are the best adjusted to reality, as being the outcome of that evolving and selecting process whose function it is to eliminate the false and preserve the true.²⁸

The view of truth expressed in these passages approximates closely the formulation of William James in *The Meaning of Truth*: "All that the pragmatic method implies, then, is that truths should *have* practical consequences."²⁹

These, then, are the pragmatic elements in the thought of Bowne. As we have indicated, they are confined largely to his writings on religion. Within that field, however, they are used widely. It is evident that they are not casual or incidental. They *first* appear in the *Studies in Theism*, published in 1877, and in the article "The Logic of Religious Belief," published in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* in 1884, and thereafter are consistently employed to the close of Bowne's work. The problem which now emerges, and to which a second study will be devoted, is that of the relationship of these pragmatic elements to Bowne's rationalism.

²⁸ Loc. cit., *Hibbert Journal*, 8 (1909-10), 892-893.

²⁹ James, William, *The Meaning of Truth* (N. Y.: Longmans, Green, 1909), p. 52.

POE AND DICKINSON

By MARY BRENT WHITESIDE

WITHIN twenty-one years of each other, and in the same state, were born the two most significant poets whom America has produced, Edgar Allen Poe and Emily Dickinson.

Superficially considered, a comparison between the two poets appears fantastic. For Poe lends himself naturally to metrical and symbolic analysis, whereas Dickinson, as far as craftsmanship is concerned, refuses to be classified and persistently breaks every rule of the game. It clarifies the situation very little to be assured that genius has a disconcerting habit of transcending limitations. Is not Poe himself an illustrious example of emotional freedom conjoined with technical restraint? But poetry, if it is of a great order, possesses an essential value that is more vital than craftsmanship, more profound than language. It is a quality independent alike of matter and manner, although colored by both. And it can best be approached through a study of *effect*. The simple device of a sympathetic reading aloud of a few characteristic poems of Emily and of Poe brings a realization of their inner quality which no analysis of craft can touch.

Poe, who understood his own genius and its limitations to a degree rare among artists, confessed that "With me poetry has not been a purpose, but a passion." Emily Dickinson could not have stated her own case more exactly, but with her the stark passion itself sufficed, while with the other it remained inarticulate until clothed with beauty.

Viewed in this light both Poe and Dickinson are poets of the naked soul, though the work of Poe appears in luminous but transparent garments. Read the work of other masters, even some of the greatest, and though the experience may result in an evocation of beauty it remains abstract. Read, on the other hand, Emily Dickinson's extraordinary poem on death, beginning:

A wife at daybreak I shall be

and follow it with almost any group of her brief, metaphysical lyrics, and one is rewarded by an uncanny sense of a personality actually at hand; the almost painful proximity of a being who reached the human limit of self-revelation. The evocation in the case of Poe is less direct, not quite instantaneous, since the verbal magic of his lines lures the reader into sensuous bypaths. Yet the final result is identical.

This extraordinary attainment was possible to both poets largely because it was unsought by either. That is to say, it was unsought as an *objective*—a process that results in a self-consciousness that defeats its own purpose. It was actually an attainment of which the most impassioned lyrics of Shelley and Byron fell short; one which Tennyson with all his artistry approached at occasional moments only. To find its parallel, we must name three masters so widely remote in time and of such dissimilar genius as the psalmist David, Sappho, and Dante.

The capacity for self revelation on the part of both Poe and Emily Dickinson may be largely due to a difference between their method and that of many other equally great artists, rather than to a difference in emotional consciousness. To follow Wordsworth's theory that poetry is breathed through "emotion recollected in tranquility" too

often has the effect of cooling the initial impulse. Emily's poetry was not based on any experience recollected in tranquility; it was emotion itself; a white hot flame that all but seared the page on which it was inscribed; a flame of too swift a burning to wait on poetic artifice. That Poe's emotion, a fire equally intense, could be held in control during adequate intervals of composition, marked a radical difference between the two as craftsmen—a difference of outer intent and purpose rather than of creative impulse.

Poe's objection to a long poem is easily understood; a sustained flight was equally impossible to Emily, and for the same reason. Genuine inspiration is instantaneous; it involves the impact of certain higher forces in which the time element is non-existent. And for both Emily and Poe a single lightning flash of inspiration encompassed a complete lyric, final and inevitable in thought and expression. Genius must follow the inexorable laws of its own inner being, and those by which these two were governed precluded such pedestrian passages as become inevitable with poets who have set for themselves less austere limitations. Hence it would be difficult to find in literature any other poets whose modicum of inferior lines is so small.

Poe the prosodist stated that "with the intellect or with the conscience it (the poetry of words) has only collateral relations." He at least has left us in no doubt as to his poetic creed. Emily was too unself-conscious as an artist even to formulate one. Not that she failed to be intensely conscious of self (she was, indeed, *super-conscious*), but it was her innermost *human* self which she sought to express, rather than herself as an artist. Each of these poets had a single unalterable goal, but in the one case that goal was beauty, and in the other, divinity.

That the two would greatly have admired each other as artists is questionable. Edgar Allen Poe, through the exigencies of theatrical life, was born in Boston, and he was twenty-one years old when Emily Dickinson first looked out on her circumscribed New England world in the nearby college town of Amherst. Dying prematurely at the age of forty-one, it would have been impossible for Poe to have known Emily's work at all except in its earliest experimental stages—those years during which she came under the influence of a discerning young tutor, Leonard Humphrey, who recognized the latent genius even in her most youthful efforts. In later life, Emily herself confessed that she knew little of the art of Poe, whose work was then enjoying a certain posthumous vogue. Had she been acquainted with *The Raven*, she might conceivably have found its artifice too deliberate and self conscious, but she would have understood and admired *The Conqueror Worm* and *Israfel*, and she would have gloried unreservedly in those fifteen lines of sheer magic, *To Helen*.

Poe, on the other hand, vitriolic critic that he sometimes was, might have scored the Amherst recluse as an epigrammatist rather than a poetic artist, yet he would have been moved by such brief and poignant elegies as the following:

This quiet Dust was Gentlemen and Ladies,
And Lads and Girls;
Was laughter and ability and sighing,
And frocks and curls.
This passive place a Summer's nimble mansion,
Where Bloom and Bees
Fulfilled their Oriental Circuit,
Then ceased like these.

And he would have been shaken by the tragic intensity of such a confession as:

I took one draught of life.
I'll tell you what I paid—
Exactly one existence;
The market price, they said.

To both poets alike the elegy was a natural and instinctive form of expression, and throughout the literature of the world it would be difficult to find more impassioned lines on the subject of death than those characteristic of these two most vitally sincere of artists. Actually, each had approached this theme by the path of human love; for the one it had been love and renunciation, for the other a brief fulfillment ending in such sorrow as would have been unbearable had it remained inarticulate. Hence, though these two poets are among the most poignant figures in our literature, Poe only is a figure of tragedy, for suffering in the one case led to an ivory tower; in the other, to an abyss.

Love, death, and beauty were Poe's trinity of themes; for Emily, the trinity was love, death, and God. "Love," she wrote in utter conviction, "*is God.*" Not an original statement, but for herself an individual and dynamic discovery. Of her emotional experience, one of her biographers wrote that it "was landscape revealed by sheet lighting." Poe would have used a different figure, but would have meant identically the same thing. Equally in each case the love life (with the one, veiled in a mystery before which speculation is vain; with the other, an open book for the world to read) became a high white flame of poetry. It was no mere interpretation of experience as in the case of other poets; it was virtually a transubstantiation. That is to say, the art itself merged into the emotion which produced it. Where other poets have been mere acolytes in the temple, swinging their perfumed censers at the feet of

the goddess, these two were high priest and priestess of love; a dedication as complete as that of Sappho, more absolute than Mrs. Browning's.

The poetic domain of each was narrow. Apparently it never occurred to either that they owed a "duty" to society. They were concerned not at all with the common life about them, but exclusively with the absorbing universe of their own souls, and out of this absorption resulted an art of unparalleled sincerity. Throughout the entire course of their lives they were in love; not necessarily with any being of flesh and blood, but with love itself as the motive force of their existence. If there were intervals in which this allegiance failed to hold them, at such moments they ceased temporarily to function as artists.

Also, both were vitally concerned, as every creative mind must be, with truth—truth as an inalienable possession of every human consciousness—an eternal principle which bears only a secondary relation to external facts, although the two have frequently been mis-identified. Both wrote with an extraordinary clarity and compression, being equally sure of the thing they had to say and the manner in which they desired to say it. If for Poe, beauty, which was his one unalterable goal, was identical with love, Emily, like Keats, found it synonymous with truth. Actually, they were approaching the same conception, and Keats himself, with an attitude different from either, would have understood both. If Emily's was the more complex nature of the two, it was not necessarily the more profound. As a philosopher the one was subtle, the other, ingenious.

"This brief tragedy of flesh," wrote Emily in one of her intimate letters. How avidly Poe might have seized upon

that phrase and developed it into a lyric of piercing intensity; one rising to a climax of such haunting beauty as that of his poem, *To One in Paradise*:

And all my days are trances,
And all my nightly dreams
Are where thy grey eye glances,
And where thy footstep gleams—
In what ethereal dances,
By what eternal streams.

Different indeed in phrasing, but of even greater poignancy are Emily's lines from the lyric *Bereaved of All*:

In cups of artificial drowse
To sleep its shape away—
The grave was finished, but the spade
Remained in memory.

"'Twas just this time last year I died," she wrote, following an emotional episode that remains shrouded in mystery; and again: "I felt a funeral in my brain." Poe, who epitomized in his own experience the essence of both lines, might actually have written either, in spite of the wide divergence between the two as literary artists, a divergence superficially accounted for by the difference in heredity. Poe, as every reader knows, came of a theatrical family, his mother as well his father being connected with the stage, while in the traditional New England of Emily Dickinson, women remained buried in the seclusion of household duties, avoiding, with few exceptions, all publicity. Yet it is more than probable that had Emily's literary mentor, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, discerned, as he apparently did not, the fire of genius in the lines which she repeatedly sent him throughout the years of her experimental work; if he had realized that, as she later wrote of herself:

My splendors . . .
Will entertain the centuries

When I am long ago,
An island in dishonored grass,
Whom none but daisies know . . .

an important chapter in our literary history would necessarily be differently written. That is to say, he might easily have persuaded her to a publicity which, without such a determining influence, she had shunned. On the other hand, publicity during her lifetime might have precluded the creation of lines compact of such timeless tragedy as the above. One may find their parallel in the Greek Anthology, or more immediately and acutely in the passionate cry of Keats, who saw his own as a "name writ in water."

Here, and throughout her poetry, Emily's immediate concern was with the possibility of her own immortality; whereas Poe's chief preoccupation was with that of the being whom he most loved. Hence, though both were egoists, Emily was actually the greater egoist of the two.

Modern criticism must note almost with incredulity that Thomas Wentworth Higginson, though a contemporary and critic of both poets, should have voiced a complaint that there was no "American poet of passion!" He demanded of lyric art that it should possess "ardor, energy, depth of feeling or of thought—a vast amount of oxygen in one's style." A reader can only pause in sheer amazement at such a summary of requirements on remembering that he was intimately acquainted with Emily and her work (which he obviously thought was unworthy of a place in the *Atlantic Monthly*, although he was instrumental in introducing her friend Helen Hunt Jackson to its pages) and that he had written a critical estimate of Poe. Yet, if he were unable to find exactly the characteristics of "ardor," "energy," and "depth of feeling" in these two, it would be difficult to do so throughout the entire range of poetry.

"Dynamite in her brain," a commentator said of Emily, and in the case of Poe, the phrase might be amended to "dynamite in the heart," a quality of intensity which has made them the two greatest individualists in American literature, Whitman offering a comparison without being an exception. Both were experimentalists, but where Poe experimented with rhythms, Emily experimented with ideas; hence the greater complexity of her thought content. Poe, as a matter of fact, was neither shallow nor subtle, and such commentators as have wasted their time and the reader's, questioning whether his *Ulalume* has any meaning whatever, have been guilty of a specious absurdity. The sole point to consider is whether the composition under discussion is genuine poetry. If the decision is in the affirmative the answer as to its having meaning is affirmative also, since all poetry through its inner nature possesses an essential meaning, even though it may elude analysis; it may possess a meaning for the heart independent of the brain.

It has been previously intimated that Poe was an ingenious thinker and a subtle craftsman, reversing to a certain extent the characteristics of Emily, whose technical peculiarities are occasionally exasperating even to her ardent admirers. In Poe's theory of poetry it was totality of effect that counted, not the beauty of isolated lines or passages. And it is in this totality of its effect that the greatness of Emily's brief, intense lyrics is to be found. To understand the art of Poe is easy. Fully to *appreciate* it on the other hand, it is necessary to understand his theory, while in the case of Emily Dickinson, it is essential, so far as circumstances permit, to understand her *life*. And that life is compound of arresting paradoxes. We know at once more—and less—of her innermost being than is possible in

the case of other poets. Of herself she has given us those things which commonly remain inexpressible, while we are left in complete ignorance of such actual facts as are ordinarily known of authors.

Immediately upon his publication of *The Raven* Poe had the experience of seeing his work become such an international sensation as was only approximated, in Emily's case, many years after her death. It is doubtful whether her poetry would have interested her own generation. Her contemporaries had not discovered "mental complexes" and the insidious influence of the psycho-analyst lay many years in the future. Here is a paradox which only professional psychology can explain! It has required a widely developed interest in psycho-analysis and related themes to induce any general appreciation of an art which is actually the simplest and most direct in our literature! Poe, of course, needs no such interpretation, although in the deeper essentials he differed as widely from his generation as did Emily. The difference was that his originality was of a type that intrigued rather than baffled his contemporaries. Yet, under a more favorable influence than that of Higginson, Emily might conceivably have become a "cult," as was the case of Poe in France, under the inspiration of Baudelaire. Nor would Poe have been deterred, as was the other, by the failure of any single critic to recognize his quality.

Poe, who was at all periods of his career a thinker, and a serious one, rated feeling above thought and loved truth chiefly for the sake of the beauty which it embodied. For Emily, thought and feeling were fused to an extraordinary degree, and such artistic beauty as she attained resulted from this fusion. From another angle, Poe's approach to truth was through science, although his was not a scientific

type of mind, while Emily's was based on her own intuitive conception of spiritual law. Yet in Poe's curious prose *tour de force*, the much misunderstood *Eureka*, he actually approached a conception of the universe by no means unlike Emily's own, although under a different terminology.¹ This prose work is the product of a sensitive and imaginative mind rather than of one trained to exact scientific thinking. Inevitably it contains many of the extravagances to be found in its author's poetry. Yet in it he discovers for himself the sublime cosmic principle of unity toward which it would seem every thinker gropes his way, and which, like any other phase of a personal religion, must be an individual experience. *Eureka* is Poe's confession of faith, although in it he attempts merely to suggest, not to prove.

Emily's own confession of faith is in every line of her poetry itself. "This heart divine—what is it? It is our own," ventures Poe, the philosopher. Emily was traveling by the same path, but did not go so far. But when he adds the thought that "Our souls no longer rebel at a sorrow which we ourselves have imposed upon ourselves, in furtherance of our purposes," he is expressing a view which Emily might have voiced in identical language. And when he wrote to Lowell, "My life has been whim, impulse, passion, a longing for solitude, a scorn of all things present," could any words, with the possible exception of the last phrase alone, have expressed more succinctly Emily's own attitude toward the world?

After the death of the Amherst poet, Higginson wrote in tardy appreciation to one of her friends: "I feel as if we had climbed to a cloud and pulled it away, and revealed a

¹ Cf. "Poe's Logic and Metaphysics" by Philip P. Weiner in *The Personalist* for October, 1933. Ed.

new star behind it." A fine tribute, although a belated one! And if the art of Emily was a star partially concealed by a cloud, that of Poe was a fiery planet reflected in troubled waters.

STAR-DUST

By WILLIAM VAN WYCK

Once, a great comet led men toward the light,
And they were wise, the wisest of their day.
Sky-hung, it flared across their vision. Bright,
Pregnant with hope, it led them on their way.
What glorious dreaming blazed within the mind
Of one of them, his wisdom's path to win
That he achieve a leaven for mankind.
The end: a stable near a little inn.
With bitter voice he cried, and in a rage:
"Star-foolishness, and I have been beguiled!
I, who have dared to call myself a sage,
Find just a nursing wench and wailing child!"
And still the lesson is not understood,
Although we preach a stable and a rood.

THE EVOLUTION OF PLATO'S REPUBLIC¹

By F. C. S. SCHILLER

PLATO'S *Republic* is the supreme work of art in philosophic literature. There is nothing to touch it in Plato's other dialogues, and still less in the works of other philosophic writers. It is incomparable, alike in matter and in form. No other philosophic book has such perfect form, no other has such a rich variety of contents, and no other has said so many new and memorable things so well. And we other philosophers ought to be thoroughly ashamed of ourselves that we have so rarely dared to emulate Plato and tried to follow in his wake.

In the scant space at my disposal I will not be expected to give more than a very sketchy idea of the greatness of Plato's work. May I begin, however, by explaining how it was, I think, that Plato succeeded in the *Republic* in surpassing, not only the other philosophers, but also himself?

We must imagine Plato as a favorite of fortune, as a great gentleman, who could trace his descent from several gods, and could himself be suspected of being the son of Apollo, living in the best society at Athens. But the Athens of his time was a rather corrupt and very fanatical democracy, and these very advantages of his birth debarred Plato from taking part in politics. Being thus excluded from political, he was forced into academic, life, and became the founder of the first Academy: the Platonic School became the first institute of higher education, and endured as such for about a thousand years.

¹ A Forum Lecture delivered at the University of Southern California on Feb. 20, 1934.

You should not, however, suppose that Plato lived an academic life merely in his library and his study. He lived a *social* life among his friends, companions, and admirers; and talked to them, no doubt, like a father or an elder brother. His teaching would be conversational rather than formal, though no doubt the lecturing habit grew upon him, as it does on most of us. Still it is unlikely that he ever became a professor in soul, like Aristotle.

Being, moreover, an artist and a psychologist, he rightly thought that something more than lectures was needed to impress his doctrines on his hearers. So he used his literary powers to compose dialogues on the topics he had lectured on, and with such dialogues he would regale the virtuous pupils who had endured to the end of his course—in order that they might carry away something memorable in their hearts.

The finest of the dialogues became the one which concluded the lectures on politics, our *Republic*. It became the finest, presumably because Plato often had occasion to lecture on politics, and was always begged to read it. He was constantly called upon, therefore, to revise it.

Internal evidence makes it highly probable that the *Republic* was repeatedly and extensively revised. The first Book has quite the air of an early Platonic dialogue of the so-called "Socratic" type. It confutes several inadequate conceptions of justice, but tells us nothing positive. Its conclusion, also, the dazzling Myth of Er the son of Armenius, may well be dated back to the time when Plato the philosopher had not yet tamed Plato the poet. Both these sections then may well have been conceived before the main argument of our present *Republic* had occurred to Plato.

But the beginning and the end of the *Republic* were soon to be welded together by a continuous argument. This extends through Books II-IV, Book VIII, and the first part of Book IX, and would yield a consistent defense of morality, as the proper good for man. It based morality on the psychology of human nature, and made justice the proper subordination and harmony of the parts of the soul.

This first stage in the evolution of the *Republic* must have comprised, also, what we no longer find in it, a short sketch of communism, based on the contention that since good friends have all things in common, they must also share wives and children, and that the citizens of the Ideal State must all be good friends. In the present state of the *Republic* these doctrines get a full discussion in Book V, but in Books III and IV there remain an allusion to the community of property in 417A, and another to that of wives and children in 424A.

If the *Republic* grew up gradually, these allusions probably mark the places where communism was originally introduced, and we thereby get a fairly definite date also for the first form of the *Republic*.

It is clear, in the first place, that the communism of the *Republic* must be later than the publication of the History of Herodotus for Plato has adopted his communism of women and children from the reason given for their customs by the Aggathyrsi in Herodotus IV, 104. They wanted the whole tribe to be friendly, and one large family.

The latest date for the *Republic*, first form, may be placed in 392-1 B. C., because it is presupposed by Aristophanes' skit on votes for women, the *Ecclesiazusae*, which ridicules ideas which we cannot but identify as Plato's.

Now we can date the *Ecclesiazusae*. Its performance was not earlier than 393 nor later than 390 B. C. So Plato was 38 at latest, and quite old enough to have worked out the plot of the *Republic*.

How did Plato react to criticism and particularly to this attack of Aristophanes? The later form of the *Republic* supplies the answer to this question. He wrote a fuller defense of Communism, and inserted it in what is now Book V. Simultaneously, no doubt, the earlier accounts were cut down to the allusions I have mentioned.

This interpretation is confirmed by his reaction to the criticism which his attack on the poets in Book III must no doubt have provoked. In this case also he did not withdraw his contention, but strengthened it. He left, however, his original text: only he reinforced his original censures, in the first part of Book X, by bringing up the heavy guns of metaphysics and expelling from his city the leader and the very best of the poets, Homer. Clearly, then, Plato was not a man to compromise and yield ground when attacked; he preferred to renew his onslaughts and to carry the war into his enemy's country.

The middle Books V-VII, to which we can add the end of Book IX, and the first part of Book X, have quite the air of after-thoughts, added probably in consequence of Aristophanes' attack. They lift Plato's argument from a psychological to a metaphysical level, and exhibit what may be regarded as the loftiest flight of his genius, in the vision of the Idea of the Good. They contain also the three great waves of paradox, with which he overwhelmed his critics, Communism, the Equality of the Sexes, better conceived as the enlistment of women in the public service, and the Philosopher-King or Rule of the Wise.

Thus in the now complete *Republic* Plato shows his mastery on three great levels of method, the dialectical, the psychological, and the metaphysical. In Book I the discussion is wholly dialectical. Here the rules of the game demand strict formal consistency, and it is necessary to defend one's thesis precisely as it was formulated, and to uphold it in its verbal integrity. Logically our guide is the analogy of the virtues with the arts: that is, if Socrates can show that the just man is *like* the skilled craftsman, Thrasymachus has to own himself beaten. But Socrates himself indicates that this method is not enough: at the end of the Book he complains that he has only shown what justice is *like*; he has not yet found out what it *is* essentially.

The sustained argument which begins in Book II and reaches its climax in Book IV is the beginning in philosophic thought both of the science of psychology and of the persistent tendency to base morals upon the conception of an ideal "nature," the normal functioning of which would insure both virtue and happiness. Both these lines of thought are handled by Plato in the most plausible and persuasive way. True, his psychology is definitely of the faculty type which is so hard to eradicate. It is hampered, of course, by the blindness of the Greek language to the existence of will; but still he succeeds in recognizing both the moral struggle and the possibility of unreasonable action in his account of "Spirit" (*thymos*), the faculty mediating between Reason and Desire. The tale of Leontios' surrender to his morbid craving to view the corpses of the executed criminals is a complete repudiation of the ethical sophistries of the Socratic tradition, and of its intellectualistic dogma that virtue was just knowledge and that true incontinence (*akrasia*), clearly conscious of what was bad and yet doing it, was not possible.

The metaphysical level reached by the *Republic* in Book VI is, I venture to think, the high water mark of Platonic metaphysics, and supplies the best clue to nearly all the later developments of metaphysics, whether by himself or others. Not, indeed, that one can justly claim that it has solved the central crux of Platonism, and made visible the *nexus* between the intelligible world and the world of sense. No subsequent metaphysic has done that; but Plato clearly shows what demands must be made upon his metaphysical principle, and neither before nor after the *Republic* did he ever come so near to success.

In the *Republic* alone does he admit that the multitude of the Ideas or Forms, which are the true realities whereof the things of sense are but blurred reflexions, must be unified in a Kosmos, in an intellectual order. They are presided over, and in a sense transcended, by the Idea of the Good, which can perform the same service for the intelligible world which each Idea performs for sensible particulars. It unifies and rationalizes the material to which it applies.

In the *Republic* alone also does Plato approach a real solution of the problem of the One and the Many, by suggesting (in 476A) that not only in their relations to sensible things but also in their relations to each other, the Ideas, in spite of their essential unity, must appear as plural.

Lastly, it is in the *Republic* alone that he supplies a key to the subsequent mathematization of the Ideas, to which Aristotle later testified.

Let me explain the second point first. The Ideal theory was, I take it, essentially a very gallant attempt to justify the practice of predication: the Idea was what vindicated

the application of the same term to a multitude of particular objects. In virtue of their subjection to the same Idea they were all related and rationalized. That is, all dogs were rendered intelligible and related *inter se* by being conceived as examples of the Very-Dog, the ideal essence which pervaded all its cases. This essential Dog was one and indivisible, and though sensible dogs appeared to be a multitude, they all participated in the idea of doghood or dogginess.

Now usually this is the point at which the Ideal Theory stops short; yet by parity of reasoning it was capable of extension into the Ideal world. The Ideas also could not be left a chaos of unrelated essences without a unifying principle. Their intelligible relations can be traced and predicated of each other. In the *Republic* Plato saw the need for such a unifying principle, and gave it a name. He called it the Idea or Principle of the Good, and exalted it above the other ideas. If they were true reality, their superior principle must transcend reality, and form a principle from which all reality could be descended. And if by "existence" the sensible world was intended, then the Idea of the Good would be still more ineffably "beyond existence."

But why was it called the Good? Because what Plato was seeking was a complete teleological explanation of everything that was understandable at all. He desired an explanation in terms of goods or ends. He would not content himself, rightly, with a merely causal and historical explanation of the form "B is because A was": he wanted to be able to show that "B is, *in order that* A may be."

But he did not imagine that this supreme good or end was known. When he comes to the point at which his eager

reader is all agog to have revealed to him the Secret of the Universe (532), Socrates tells Glaucon that he cannot explain the Good further, because Glaucon has not read enough mathematics. Here Plato is really telling his readers that *science* is not sufficiently advanced to permit of the deduction of the laws of nature from a single principle.

That is as true now as then, and that it should still be true in spite of the fact that the sciences have made such astounding progress without the philosophers discovering the Good, is a proof that there was a grave error in Plato's calculation.

This error becomes manifest when we ask how deduction from a single principle is possible. For Aristotle has taught the world that to deduce a conclusion we have need of *two* premises, and in the Good Plato had only *one*. His ideal of rational proof was formally impossible. Yet his argument has been the inspiration of all monistic metaphysics ever since!

Plato's mistake about the form of deduction was the reason also, I believe, of his mathematizing of the Ideas and equating them with numbers. For when he looked round the world to find something analogous to the intelligible relation of the Ideas to the Good, in virtue of which they might all follow rationally from it in infinite number and variety, he discovered the number-system. Here was a completely rational system, in which an infinity of numbers were deducible by rigid necessity from the One, the Unit, and, in virtue of this very deduction, every number could stand in an infinity of intelligible and eternal relations to all other numbers. If, therefore, we can equate

the numbers with the Ideas, and the Good with the One, shall we not understand the whole rational order of the cosmos?

Alas, that there should have been an error in this analogy! Plato had overlooked that the One alone does not generate the number-system. To evolve the system out of the unit, units have to be *added*, 1 to 1 and 1 to 2, etc. The *operation* of addition is indispensable: it is the missing second principle which cannot be omitted, and Aristotle triumphs!

There is a further flaw in Plato's account of the relation of metaphysics to the sciences, though a majority of philosophers still seems to suppose that his account is adequate. Plato argued that because scientific procedure was hypothetical it was insecure, and the initial hypotheses stood in need of validation by a metaphysical deduction from the supreme principle, the Good. Now this assumption means that all proof must in the end be *a priori*, and implies that for lack of knowledge of the Good no scientific progress should have been possible. Actually, however, it has occurred: *ergo* there must have been an error in the argument. Plato's error lay in thinking that scientific principles cannot be established empirically and *a posteriori*: he had overlooked the initial stage in every science, in which experimentation with principles is in order, and they are selected and verified by their working. True, this procedure does not lead to absolute and indefeasible truths (which all remain in fact dependent and hypothetical); but it yields sciences that are effective and progressive to infinity. Moreover even a slight study of the history of science shows that this is how our present principles have come to be established, and how the sciences have made their selections between possible alternatives.

Let us return, however, from the rarefied altitudes of metaphysics to the mire of politics. In this region also the *Republic* has left its mark. It has proclaimed gorgeous paradoxes which no political philosophy can overlook. Plato stands out as the great aristocratic revolutionary, and his proposals are immensely stimulating. But they could never be realized, and when they have all been thought out they, too, all have their flaws.

In his advocacy of the political equality of the sexes Plato argues that the differences between men and women are not *relevant* to their political functions, and so gives the first example of an appeal to relevance. But, unlike "validity," relevance is always a disputable notion, and experience only can decide whether these differences are relevant or not.

In his plea for Communism Plato seems to make the hazardous assumption that selfishness will wither and become extinct if it is deprived of its usual fields of exercise, private property and the family. But this argument will prove fallacious if the new social order affords scope to selfishness in other than the traditional ways. Plato does not pause or stoop to consider this possibility. Actually it may be shown that selfishness would necessarily be engendered and fostered in every citizen of the Kallipolis precisely because he is deprived of the shelter of a family. From the day of his birth he would be forced to fight for his own hand and to make good his position by his own unaided efforts. His existence would be possible only on condition that he remained popular with his equals and won the favor of his superiors. By the time he rose to positions of power he would assuredly have been moulded into an accomplished hypocrite, profuse in his professions of public spirit, but utterly selfish at the core.

Lastly the rule of the philosopher also would fall far short of the ideal. It would actually degenerate into a bureaucracy. The philosopher-king, the man who combines the highest knowledge and the ripest experience, offends against Plato's own canon, in Book II, of the division of labor, and is not allowed to specialize. Plato does indeed absolve him from the duty of increasing knowledge by postulating that knowledge must be completed before he takes office: the Idea of the Good, which forms the coping-stone of all the sciences, must be known before the Ideal State can be founded upon this knowledge and the Kallipolis can start upon its career. But there are two ways by which the rulers can keep themselves superior in knowledge to the ruled, and to perfect themselves in all knowledge is not the easiest way. It is much simpler and easier to preserve their superiority by keeping their subjects ignorant, and such has always been the policy of rulers who claimed to rule by virtue of their superior knowledge. That is what the Jesuits did in Paraguay and the Brahmins in India. It is what the Catholic Church has tended to do always and everywhere.

If we are curious to know how the Ideal State would have worked out in practice, we have merely to study the history of the Middle Ages. There we shall find a society organized into three castes, with workers deprived of all power, but exempt from military service, with the Knights as the fighting auxiliaries of the spiritual rulers or clergy, and these culminating in the Supreme Pontiff, the Pope, as the philosopher-king. It is almost needless to add that the verdict of history has not been favorable to this constitution of society, and it certainly did not lead either to a happy and harmonious state or to a supremacy of wisdom.

I would suggest, therefore, that in the end the most valuable of Plato's contributions to politics may turn out to have been his launching of the ideal of eugenics.

From lack of time I must pass over with a bare mention many more of the brilliant ideas enshrined in the *Republic*. Plato's ascetic censorship of Art, which shocks us as so illiberal, was forced upon him in large measure by the fact that the moral motive appeared to the Greeks in the æsthetic guise of the Beautiful (*to kalon*): hence it was imperative to control social opinions about the beautiful in the interests of conduct. Nor could the votaries of Art deny that if the Good is defined as the supreme end of action, artistic activities also must be subjected to its sway.

Plato's pessimistic theory of pleasure in Book IX, on the other hand, was an incidental consequence of the physiological analysis of vital process or metabolism which he had taken over from his predecessors. If the whole metabolism is analyzed into twin processes of catabolism, impairment or "emptying," and of anabolism, repair, or "filling," it follows that the former has the priority and that the latter can at most make good the loss. In principle all pleasures are paid for in advance by antecedent pains, and at death life must always end in uncompensated pain. Yet this unattractive theory has more than held its own in the opinion of philosophers with Aristotle's psychological amendment, which took the form of declaring pleasurable the whole functioning of the organism, its normal "energeia," so long as it was not thwarted and warped by impediments.

The *Republic's* theory of education as a life-long process is justly famous, and corresponds closely to the present training of a Jesuit priest. Noteworthy also is Plato's

preference for science over literature as the medium of the highest education, and the consequent attack on Homer, the Bible of the Greeks.

The doctrine of immortality in Book X gives rise to many problems, alike in its scientific and in its physical part. The comparison of the Soul to Glaucus the sea god, battered by the waves and overgrown with shells and seaweeds, would seem to indicate that the *Republic* already adopts the later doctrine of the *Timaeus*, which distinguishes between a mortal and an immortal part of the soul and regards desire and the moral nature as evanescent accretions grown upon the soul's eternal essence by its immersion in the sea of becoming. But then what becomes of the justice of punishing souls for their moral lapses, even to the extent of eternal damnation, as exemplified in the case of Ardiæus the Tyrant? And what again of the central paradox of the Platonic doctrine of immortality? How can a theory which apparently restricts eternal reality to the Ideas and declares that plurality is an illusion of the senses and that there is only one of each idea, conceivably provide for an immortality of *plural* souls? The doctrine of the *Republic* throws no light on this crux. Its scientific argument as in the other dialogues seems to prove the immortality of soul as a principle, not of individual souls, and no consistent conception can be extracted from it either of the unity or of the plurality of the human self.

And yet after all these cavils we cannot help confessing that Plato stands out as the one philosopher of the first rank who seems genuinely and perpetually to concern himself with the problem of immortality: yet he always leaves his meaning in a tantalizing state of uncertainty.

Whatever Plato's eschatology may have meant, I want to draw attention, finally, to the subtle way in which the end of Book X reverts to a question casually thrown out in Book I, and there left unanswered. Cephalus, the good old man who has practiced kindness and justice all his life, had candidly confessed that he had always treated the tales of the after-life as fables, with which he need have no concern: but now that he felt that his days were drawing to a close, he was growing afraid that there might be some truth in them, but hoping that his just dealing might stand him in good stead. Cephalus is dismissed early from the dialogue, for it would be a shame to subject him to the torments of the Socratic cross-examination, and presumably goes to bed: but Plato was too good a psychologist not to know that fears such as he had expressed were quite common, and determined to allay them. So the final transfiguration scene of the *Republic* gives the reply that the just man at any rate need not fear. If he has wisely studied philosophy his sense of the true values of life will keep him safe when he passes through the ordeal of reincarnation, even though the fool may ruin, and even damn, himself by his greed for the fleeting goods of this world of shows. The reply, though not perhaps devoid of moral difficulties, is neat, and beautifully knits together the two ends of the *Republic*.

KNOWING THE REAL

The Mind-Body Organization for Personal Action

By the late H. WILDON CARR

1. *The Ideal Nature of Knowledge*

KNOWLEDGE is the ideal representation of reality. The mind is real, the body is real, the universe is real, but knowledge is ideal. Knowledge is a value, not an existence. It consists of ideas, and ideas are in the mind. Ideas represent two kinds of personal experience: first, the immediate awareness of the world in sense-perception, and second, the conceptions of reflective thoughts about reality. Both perceptions and conceptions are formed by the mind. Nothing which is real on its own account comes into the mind; it is represented in the mind by an idea.

Knowing, accordingly, is an activity of the mind. On this there is no disagreement, but philosophers are divided in their view of the nature of the activity. Let us consider first the personalist view. This is that knowing is essentially the creation of value by giving artistic and philosophical expression to the personal nature of the knower. In other words, knowing is not a relation between a person and its world; it is an essential part of the activity which constitutes personality.

Personality is an organization of conscious experience round a center of originating activity. The person is an individual mind-body organism, understanding and willing, expressing its thoughts and desires in actions. Its activity depends on receptivity to external influences and the re-

sponse of an already formed and continually forming nature. In the human individual personality is the exercise of the physical activities of perceiving, remembering, imagining, thinking, and in the practical control of a corporeal instrument of expression in outward action. Every æsthetic image, every logical concept, which the mind forms is relative to the corporeal actions which the mind directs. In knowing, therefore, according to the personalist theory, the person is exercising an activity which is theoretical in distinction from an activity which is practical, the two activities being organically related. This theoretical activity is the idealization of reality in images and concepts. There is, indeed, a limitation to the spontaneity of this mental creation, for in every person there exists already a pre-formed nature, and just as every individual carries through life the scar on its body which marks its separation from the parent stock when the umbilical cord was severed at birth, so the mind carries inherited dispositions derived from primitive instincts. This is the personalist principle. It amounts to affirming that the mind in knowing is drawing on its own nature, developing, unfolding, self-creating.

The naturalist principle is that the mind in knowing contemplates an outer reality present to it and reacts to this external reality by its own sensitivity. It supposes in the organism a refinement of structure and function which has endowed it with awareness, discrimination, and ratiocination. Knowledge, according to this principle, is a purely natural and easily understood relation between two things when one of them is mind. All it requires us to postulate in the organized creature is awareness of its compresence with something not itself which it contemplates, and its power to profit by experience.

Let us, then, keeping these two antithetical principles before us, consider the problem as it has formed itself in the historical development of philosophy.

2. *The Nature of Sense Perception*

John Locke defined an idea as the immediate object of the mind when it thinks. This use of the term idea has been generally accepted, although we continue to use the term idea in a more restricted sense, for when we divide knowledge into two kinds, sensible and intelligible, we distinguish perceptions from conceptions, images from ideas. The idea which is an immediate object is not an entity with an independent status. It is not itself reality but representative of reality, and a representation is a relation. A representation intermediates between two ideas in the restricted meaning of the term idea. The idea or representative exists, then, only in the relation of a subject to an object, of the mind to the world, and it is only this relation which can be directly known. Perception is an activity exercised by the mind or subject and directed on the world or object, but neither mind nor object, neither agent nor thing acted on can be perceived. In knowing, therefore, two terms are in relation, a subject and an object; and the activity of knowing has two aspects: subjectively it is a felt modification, objectively it is an image; but what we actually know is neither the subject nor the object, neither the mind nor the thing, but a relation between them.

We may easily convince ourselves of the truth of the fact that what we immediately know is always a relation, if we reflect on some of the ordinary illusions of sense perception. Suppose I am walking by a moonlit sea. The wavelets sparkle in a broad line of sheen originating in a definite point, spreading towards one in a definite band

over the surface, and contrasting with the dark invisibility around. As I watch the rippling surface I may see some dark object, say a boat propelled by rowers, enter the glittering zone. It is suddenly bathed in resplendent light. How difficult to believe that this brilliance of illumination into which it suddenly enters and out of which it passes has no objective counterpart in the experience of the boatmen. How impossible to think that the sheen exists only for me who observe it—that it depends on a convergence of the rays of light which enter my eyes, and that in nature there is no convergence.

What, then, is this representation which mediates between the internally originated, externally directed, activity of the mind and the world in which the real conditions of existence appear to lie? It is not a sensation, nor is it an assemblage or aggregation of sensations. It may be true that our knowledge is dependent ultimately on the senses and refers to sense experience for its signification. We may subscribe to the maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu querit*, and even if we qualify it with the *nisi intellectus ipse* we may still hold that the intellect emptied of sense content has no distinctive mark by which it can be recognized. Yet even so the representation or perception or idea has nothing in common with sensation. I prick my finger and feel a smart pain: what I sense as a sensation is the pain, what I perceive is the pin or thorn which I imagine to be wounding my flesh. I feel a pleasant warmth suddenly change to a painful heat: I have a rapid succession of sensations, but what I perceive is a single image, the fire. I see the bows drawn across the strings as I watch the players in the orchestra; I hear the sounds produced; I have various and diverse sensations; what I perceive is the symphony. I do not sense the symphony,

although I may enjoy many sensations while I am perceiving it. In all these cases—the pin, the fire, the symphony—the perception is not a sensation or group of sensations, nor is it composed of a sort of stuff called *sensa* or *sensibilia*, terms used to convey the idea of an objective counterpart of sensation. The perception is the image brought to the mind by a sensation, and it represents an objective reality in regard to which the sensation is no more than a point of contact.

3. *The Theory of Sensa*

Let us consider the theory of *sensa*. It is an extreme form of realism adopted by philosophers who have taken seriously and grappled strenuously with the topical contradictions inherent in common sense and scientific realism. It rejects the view that the objective world consists of objects known by their sensible qualities, of which qualities we are fitted by our sensitive organization to be aware. The act of awareness in their view is in its simple and immediate nature the sensing of a *sensum*, the sensing act being the subjective, the *sensum* the objective counterpart of the knowing relation. The real world in its objective aspect is taken, therefore, to consist of *sensa*—patches of color, noises, tastes, smells, etc.—all individual objects of individual acts of awareness. The illustration now almost classical is the analysis of the penny we handle and pass from one to another as a medium of exchange. We think of this penny as something which remains identical, although there is no identity in its appearances, the variety of which we attribute to perspective. There is no penny. There are an infinite number of *sensa* which we class together as appearances of the penny. In fact, however, these so-called appearances are individual *sensa*, and the only reality is the individual, inviolable, and objective *sensum*; but we classify

these *sensa* and give one name to the classification. The penny is the class of its appearances. Whether there exist in the world unsensed *sensa* as well as the *sensa* which are sensed, or whether the unsensed *sensum* = 0 is a question on which those who hold this theory are not agreed.

It is odd, of course, to be told that when, for example, I ask my neighbor to pass the salt, I am actually requiring of him that he should direct his attention to a class of appearances, namely, his *sensa*, and act in such a way that a class of appearances, my *sensa*, shall supervene on his action. Yet we must remember that any hypothesis which will interpret a common sense fact must appear odd, when set side by side with the common sense interpretation of the fact. If, for example, we take the scientific account of any ordinary event in our sense experience, it will seem very extravagant. The physicist will tell me that what is actually causing my sense experience is not anything sensible at all, but changes in a conglomeration of electrical constituents with a peculiar structure which I cannot be made sensibly aware of in any manner. There could hardly be a greater outrage to common sense, yet we accept it without question.

We may, therefore, set aside as irrelevant any criticism of the *sensa* theory on the basis of its paradoxical character and go straight to the principle on which the theory is based. It is a naturalistic, as opposed to a personalistic, interpretation of sense perception. It affirms that efficiency or agency or whatever stands for the originating cause of sense perception is to be located on the objective or external side of the knowing relation and not on the subjective or internal side. It rests on the denial of agency to life or consciousness, a denial which seems to have the support of a natural instinct. The true criticism of the *sensa* theory is that the

sensa are, in their conception and by definition inert, and to suppose that the inert can exert efficiency is, when we reflect on it, a self-contradiction and essentially irrational.

The personalistic principle in its application may seem even more paradoxical than the naturalistic principle, but at least it claims to be rational fundamentally and in every application of it. It is based on the metaphysical identification of reality with activity. Anything is what it does: what does nothing is nothing. Pure inertia is accordingly ruled out. Inertia is phenomenon or appearance, not reality. Perception, therefore, on this principle must be interpreted as an activity of the person. What we have to consider is the mode of working.

Let the reader imagine himself in a room the walls of which are mirrors and illuminated from within. There will appear to be no limit to his visible extension, together with a very sensible limit to his tactual extension. The familiar phenomenon is usually described as a natural illusion. The image reflected by the mirror does not seem to be where it is, on the surface of the mirror, but somewhere behind it. The notable thing is that the illusion persists. When we have satisfied ourselves of the exact dimensions of the room and the actual distances of the reflected images, we continue to see them in an extension which has no real counterpart in the physical world. We are able, of course, to explain the illusion by a physical theory, or at least to find a satisfactory interpretation of it in the laws of reflection. It offers, however, a curious analogy to the general problem of sense-perception. Our range of effective action is narrowly limited, confined in fact to the part of the world we can control by our muscles and such tools as we can bring to their aid, but our range of perception extends indefinitely beyond the range of action.

It is not only in the sense of vision that the kind of illusion we have instanced arises. It occurs in regard to all the senses in so far as they are what the physiologist describes as distance receptors. Thus, when we listen in on the radio, we know that the song or speech or symphony which we hear is actually emitted from a disk in our proximity, but the perception is not located there. We locate it according to circumstances where it would be if we were in the assembly room or concert hall. Our knowledge that it is transmitted by the Hertzian waves over vast spatial intervals is not, of course, perceptual knowledge, and does not affect our perception.

It would seem very difficult to suggest any scheme, or devise any mode, or conceive any possible way, by which these illusions of perception, if they are illusions, or these revelations of perception, if they represent truth concerning reality, are generated by the simple sensing of *sensa*. Clearly there is some kind of subjective activity in perceiving, for otherwise no question of interpretation could ever arise. The act of sensing according to the *sensa* theory is not an exertion of creative activity, it is merely the subjective counterpart of a relation in which the presence of an object is known by a subject. There is only activity in so far as activity is implied in contemplation; the knowing itself is enjoyment. In such a theory there is no place for illusion, natural or artificial.

4. *Perception and Apperception*

In considering the nature of perception an important distinction must be kept in mind. Leibniz was the first to give emphasis to it, and Kant raised it to a point of paramount importance in theory of knowledge. It is the distinction between perception and apperception, between simple

consciousness or awareness of externality and self-consciousness or awareness of being aware. Apperception is a higher level of attainment, bringing with it rational powers which do not exist at the lower levels.

Perception is synonymous with consciousness when we use the term consciousness in its widest extension. In its primary and most general meaning perception is an activity impossible to dissociate from life. A living creature as distinct from an inanimate thing responds from within to influences from without and this internal response is an activity. We may, indeed, in imagination endow an inert particle or inanimate thing with awareness, but to do so would be purely fanciful and meaningless, whereas we cannot form the most abstract conception of living activity without perception.

Picture a pool into which by dropping a pebble (the illustration is Leibniz's) you set up a series of undulations spreading from the center of disturbance through the whole volume of water. Now imagine that in the pool there are at various points 'centers of indetermination' where the undulations meet not with simple obstruction but with a force able to divert and redirect them. The conception of such a center of indetermination is the conception of living activity in its most abstract form, and such activity implies perception. In this very abstract meaning perception appears almost physical. Now complete the picture. Imagine the pool to consist entirely of centers of indetermination, each determining itself by the direction it gives to the radiated forces impinging on it and each at the same time limited in its activity by the activity of the others. Then in the awareness of its own limitations each would be perceiving all the rest. If, in accordance with the personalist

principle that the real is essentially active and individual, we regard the universe as the composition of self-acting unit natures or substances, we may see the meaning in which the whole universe is pictorially present in the perception of each individual. We may also see the basis on which a hierarchy of spiritual attainment can be established in the degree of comprehension which perception can acquire.

5. *Sense imagery*

Perception, however, is more than general awareness; it has a characteristic form of its own. It is an awareness which finds expression in imagery. This is the distinctive feature of perception. According to any theory of knowledge it is by sense perception that the mind is made aware of external reality. The personalist view is that this reality is the aggregate of active natures, each expressing itself after its manner, which with the perceiving individual himself constitute the universe. Each perceiver can only perceive the externality from a central position, and from within looking outwards. Perception, therefore, must be representative; it is the aspect of the universe as the universe is reflected to an active center within it. Also it must be pictorial, for it is the aspect which active natures assume to an active nature. How, then, is the character of the picture determined? On what principle is the external world differentiated? How are the images of objects with definite outlines and determinate qualities formed? And what is the validity of the knowledge so derived?

A study of the mechanism of sense perception suggests the line along which it may be possible to seek answers to these questions. The most cursory view of the various plans on which living creatures are organized shows that the sense organs are disposed in the animal and developed

in their function and extent *pari passu* with the adaptation of the structure to definite forms of actions. With every adaptation of living species to special environmental conditions calling for skeletal and muscular transformation there is a concomitant adaptation of sensory organs. Illustrations abound. They used to form the stock arguments for the existence of God based on the evidence of design in nature.

A first answer, therefore, to the question, What is perception? is that it is the factor in living activity without which purposive actions would be impossible. It is a necessary condition of the formation of an action. But why is perception pictorial? How does it acquire its representative form? Why does a process which is quantitative and has only quantitative distinctions in reality assume quality and qualitative distinctions in consciousness? Why, to take a specific example, does a quantitative difference in the vibrations of a medium, the atmosphere, give rise in the mind to the qualitative difference of the musical note? Whence comes the sense imagery with which we clothe "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth"? The universe as science conceives it has no place for imagery and no use for it. Science admits that sense imagery represents the reality of the physical world, but it cannot explain how it does so or why. A study of the sense organs and their functioning can give us no clue. They are selective. The retina is sensitive to a very limited range of etherial pulsations; the ears and the organ of Corti are sensitive to a limited range of atmospheric vibrations; the heat and cold spots are sensitive to an almost infinitesimal range of discriminations of molecular velocities; the nasal membrane and the taste bulbs of the mouth are sensitive to a range of impressions less easy to distinguish from

their qualities and yet physically quantitative; finally, the pain terminals are sensitive to impressions difficult to dissociate from quality and yet only conceivable like all the rest quantitatively. In the perceptivity of perception the sense organs seem to have as their function simply selection. They act towards the various physical pulsations to which they are fitted to be sensitive, as a screen. They play the same kind of role as the diaphragm plays in relation to the objective lens of the microscope, increasing the definition of the object by excluding the excessive illumination. We may say, then, that while the sense organs perform an essential part in the mechanism of perception, a part which seems physical rather than ideal, yet they do not give us any clue to the nature and origin of the pictorial and representative character of perception itself.

The personalist theory of this representative character of perception is that it is a product of the creative æsthetic activity of the subject. The creation of images and concepts is spiritual, the work of the mind, not of nature. It is the peculiar work of the imagination and the intellect. Thus while at its lower limit perception is hardly distinguishable from the mechanistically conceived relations by which science represents the continuity of the physical universe, at its higher limit it introduces us into the spiritual universe of art and philosophy.

It is interesting at this point to take note of the dilemma which confronts the realist in regard to this pictorial nature of perception, that is, to its quality as sense imagery. If he adopts the *sense* theory and regards the *sensa* as the material of the objective world, he is met with the difficulty that the objective world of physics does not consist of *sensa*. The reals of science are imperceptible in themselves and

only made manifest in their group or mass effects. The laws of nature for physical science are statistical laws. The unit individual constituents and their behavior as individuals have to be deducted from the group behavior. The realist, therefore, is faced with the dilemma that either he must reject the reals of physics as pure fictions or he must regard the *sensa* as representative only of the reals and not as themselves reals. What he actually does is either to fall back on the hypothesis of a psycho-physical parallelism, or else formulate a theory of neutral monism according to which reality has a double aspect, physical and mental, and in itself is neither purely one nor purely the other. Either device sacrifices the naivety of the knowing relation, which is the attraction of the realist theory of perception in its first presentation.

(To be concluded in next issue)

SEA GULL

By ANN FOX

Again that vague despair enshadows me,
Ineffable and sudden, that from birth
Has veiled for me the shining ecstasy
Of every sight and sound I've loved on earth.
It is a gull adrift upon the air,
Afloat the dreamy ways the sea gulls go,
Whose tranced flight now stirs my old despair.
Why should a dreaming sea gull move me so?
Has beauty come too close, too naked flown,
Too primally for earthly eyes to face?
Or, in that craft, irrevocable, lone,
Sailing the seas of timeless, pathless space
Illimitable, is it my soul I see
Forever launched upon eternity?

REFLECTIONS OF A PERIPATETIC

I.

By THE EDITOR

C RANMER-BYNG begins a book on Asia by repeating a saying of Radhakrishnan: "Life is a great adventure and not a set scheme," to which should be added for perfection of completeness the word of Charles Frohman on the sinking Titanic: "And after all, death is the great adventure of life." To the words of Radhakrishnan, Byng adds his own: "With this gesture of farewell we turn our backs upon the West."

¶ All of which epitomizes our own feeling as we turn our prow out from young, hopeful, disillusioned, struggling America, longing for peace and finding none, first to war-minded Europe and then to that vast enigma of the future, Asia.

¶ At its best, civilization is a slow process; for while to the intellectual and spiritual leader it might come overnight, it cannot really and fully come until the last straggler of the rear-guard and even the motley collection of camp-followers, the rag-tag of civilized life, have been induced to join the main body. This it is much more easy to declare impracticable than it is to bring to pass. And yet there is no solution to the present difficulties of society until we attempt this task. Not that we shall solve them but that the very effort to meet the demands of "The Great Society" becomes in itself an organizing principle that acts upon the whole body of civilization.

¶ The question at once arises, "What is civilization?" The

average definition of the dictionaries shows how little consideration has yet been given to its meaning; for the first enlightenment they cast upon the subject is "the state of being civilized." Then follow definitions by Guizot and Matthew Arnold which do but little to clear up the vagueness. One gathers from these, however, that civilization may be the art of living together under recognized forms of behavior and government which replace the individualism, banditry and force of strong against weak which is the mark of barbarism.

¶ At this point one is likely to raise the question whether civilization now exists or whether we are not the witnesses of and participants in a more or less spotty and modified savagery. Within our own borders there is the continuous struggle of the strong against the weak, the backward drag of the lazy against the industrious, the suspicion of the ignorant against the educated, the contempt of the proud against the unfortunate. In a local and national way we have in times and in places managed to weld these warring forces into a temporary sympathy and cooperation, but it needs only the touch of common disaster of hard times, of insecurity, to let loose all the fateful forces of revolution as surely as from Pandora's box flew all human ills save only delusive hope.

¶ However bright has been the promise of an achieved civilization, it has been for the most part within the circumscribed bounds of community and nation and is only occasionally continental, to say nothing of the world-civilization which has dwelt for long in the imagination of men but has not yet been born. In a world in which there are no longer any frontiers we are attempting to carry on in the manner of essential barbarism, in a spirit of greed, of suspicion, of mutual distrust. The profits of society are being

steadily consumed not for education, the general enlightenment, the amelioration of ills, but in sharpening our knives against an imagined coming conflict and in full knowledge that our neighbors are doing the same for us.

¶ We have those amongst us who claim that this irrational principle of conflict is the only one that can survive being so deeply imbedded in both mundane and heavenly nature, but if that is so it can mean only the destruction and collapse of intelligence. Obviously what has here and there been achieved in communities and in nations must now be sought on a world-wide scale. We need to raise our definition of civilization from the individual and parochial to the international plane. There must be a determination of nations to live together in ordered harmony for the good of all.

¶ This harmony must be exercised in many phases. It involves a give and take in education, in communal and national arts, in diverse cultures and in religions, for there is none so proud and mighty but that it has something to learn and profit by the lowliest and the least. Until this "feeling" is achieved there cannot be the mutual sympathy which makes cooperation possible. There is need that we should stand on our feet like men, and, challenging the rest of the world so to stand, to think without contempt and to speak without patronage, to learn more surely than to teach, and to banish by an act of will and of love all temptation to misunderstanding.

¶ That we may see and understand, that we may be better able to sympathize with other men and other races, that we may realize the common bonds that bind our destiny together, that we may catch some new conception of our common brotherhood in the common fatherhood of God, because of the hope which lingers in the box of fate, we turn our faces eastward.

CURRENT THOUGHT

"The Impossibility of Metaphysics"

IN THE absence of any accepted or acceptable philosophy, it is perhaps the philosopher's chief business to seek issues which cut deep and which, when clarified, may bring to light the world-view which at the time in half-darkness is being discovered, formed, and chosen. Such an issue seems to be presented in current philosophical literature through two opposing articles. The one, "Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," by Mr. A. J. Ayer, published in the July Number of *Mind*, is a restatement in simple language of Mr. Wittgenstein's position. The other, "Experience and Meaning," by Professor C. I. Lewis, a presidential address published in the March Number of *The Philosophical Review*, is an important contribution to critical metaphysics, constituting a direct refutation of the Vienna School's central theory of meaning.

In recent years *behaviorism* has acted as a catalytic around which many current attitudes and trends have crystallized. But behaviorism has been too empirically bound to provide the foundation in itself for a thoroughgoing philosophy. In the principles of logical positivism, as represented by Wittgenstein and others of his school, however, we find a thoroughgoing behaviorism without Behaviorism's physiological limitations.

So close is the theoretical relationship between these independent movements, that it is quite possible to interpret logical positivism as behaviorism expanded to include the frankly introspective fields of logic and mathematics; thus one may accurately describe behavioristic psychology as physiological positivism and logical positivism as philosophical behaviorism. For, contrary to popular misunderstanding, behaviorism is not concerned with inquiries into the *stuff* of existence—whether consciousness or matter. Such questions are abhorred as metaphysical nonsense. Rather, its interest, like that of Berkeley, lies in what can be directly and positively grasped. Thus the central assumption of the behaviorist is not naturalism, but a theory of meaning,—a theory which holds that observations which claim any significance whatever must not only be clear, distinct, and objective, but must be positive and direct. In these respects behaviorism and logical positivism are at one.

As Mr. Ayer clearly shows the logical positivist's theory of meaning leads directly and simply to the abandonment of all metaphysics, where metaphysics is defined as any would-be propositions

which seek to deal with that which underlies and therefore transcends phenomena. Just how much of human thought would be included under metaphysics is an important question, though it is clear that the logical positivists are willing to salvage some fragments of philosophy and are eager to acclaim positive science. As logicians, however, they are much too accute to save themselves, and they are frank in including their own philosophy in their sweeping *reductio ad absurdum*. Like many mystics they claim that the very attempt to deal with transcendent or would-be-transcendent meanings in ordinary terms can result only in "senseless nonsense." Thus they offer their philosophy only as a vaccine to attack and forestall more malignant and less manageable doses of the same disease. It is a philosophy to end philosophy. With this paradox of nonsense Mr. Ayer attempts to deal, though without success. For the final step in a logical treatment of the illogical is silence. As Wittgenstein himself remarks in another context, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Happily, however, the logical positivists continue to restate their views with a vigour which compels attention to their problem.

This problem, as we have seen, is at bottom the problem of meaning. According to the logical positivist's definition, a proposition to have meaning must be theoretically verifiable; that is, it must lead to some positive result; it must be theoretically possible to discover whether the proposition is true or false. In dealing with this contention Professor C. I. Lewis demonstrates with a limiting case and illustrates with several others the way in which meaning often outruns verifiability:

In the nature of the case I cannot verify you as another center of experience distinct from myself. Any verification which I might suppose myself to make would violate the hypothesis by being first-person experience. But there is nothing to which I can give more explicit empirical content than the supposition of a consciousness like mine connected with a body like my own.

Even more important than his discussion of verification and his defence of the meaning of metaphysical ideas, however, is Professor Lewis' treatment of the "meaning" of positive thought. For by pressing the positive down to the directly immediate, ruling out memories and anticipations and meanings which transcend the here and now, such as the concept of the atom, he forces the logical positivist into a solipsism of immediacy, and finds therein the meaninglessness which logical positivists claim for the philosophy of others as well as for themselves.

H. Jeffery Smith.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

First Nights

By this title one does not necessarily refer to the glaring Kleig lights that sweep the sky by night, accompanied by the stir of human crowds, the raucous chorus of automobile horns, the megaphoned voices of announcers, the simpering approach and banal speech of movie stars into broadcasting receivers and the gaping thousands of empty heads being held back by police cordons.

That is the type of "first night" in which we confess no interest.

We refer rather to that "first night" away from scenes like this, under the eaves of the old farm-house, with the voices of whip-poor-wills drifting in, or under the rafters of a mountain cabin, or beneath the silent stars themselves. That "first night" is given only to light and wakeful slumber. The very silence is more vocal than the sound of the accustomed street traffic. There is that about it which is like the release from pain, a loosening of tension which itself seems a shock. Thus this "first night" I lie content to gather in the unaccustomed silence and the little, unaccustomed noises of the forest, or the gurgle of my little tumultuous river, hurrying, forever hurrying, like life itself, to its rest in the sea, eager to take on some new phase of existence.

Such a "first night" is a readaptation of the human spirit to a new environment and in its highest sense a new experience of unity with nature herself. And we of all her creatures seem alone capable of spiritual adaptation to her moods. The animal seems fixed upon the inexorable wheel of physical destiny but man can readapt himself. A crisis, a new outlook, communion with nature and the old life, old complexes that have held us to narrowing points of view, that have bound us to restricted vision and action, these slip away and lo! all things become new. Man has within himself the startling possibility of becoming a new creature. He makes the new world into which he goes. His destiny is not forced upon him, it is his own.

Thus dreaming and thus thinking, one drops on such a "first night" to peaceful slumber, strong in a diviner strength, "sure of the Father, self and love alone."

R. T. F.

OUR FOREIGN LETTER

Personalism In Indian Philosophy

THE *Bhagavat Puranam*, the Bible of the *Vaishnavas*, an Encyclopaedic treatise of eighteen thousand verses, is not so well known to the West as the *Bhagavat Gita*, although it deals with the fundamental problems of life, religion, and reality with a greater amplitude of detail and with a greater mastery. In bulk it is as large as the combined *Dialogues* of Plato. In spirit it is neither exclusively theological nor logical, nor merely ethical, as we understand the terms, but out and out metaphysical. There is a good deal of charming mythology, melodious poetry, fanciful cosmology, striking episode, excellent allegory, false statistics and falser geography; but these constitute the form and not the substance, the body and not the soul of this monumental work, which is represented by a militant and conclusive metaphysic associated with a sublime theology and a correct code of ethics. In Indian thought, it may be noted, the existence of Ethics, Metaphysics, and Theology in separate water-tight compartments is unknown. They are mingled, and harmoniously mingled: and nowhere better than in the *Bhagavat Puranam*.

It is barely possible within the short space at our disposal to give an idea of the system of the *Bhagavat Puranam*, with the help of a few verses typically selected. The first verse strikes the keynote of the whole book. It runs:

I bow down to (literally, I meditate upon) the One, the substance out of which the process of creation, destruction, and preservation of the Universe flows, as demonstrated by methods of agreement and difference; which is Omniscient, and self-illuminated, and which reveals to Brahma (De-miurgus of the Greek Philosopher) the supreme knowledge which stupifies even the very gods; but for which the Universe of three spheres (heaven, earth and hell) would have been a delusive appearance; and which is the supreme truth, through the bright rays of which all the magical devices of untruth or *Maya* are undone.

Here we get the bold metaphysical ethics underlying the whole system definitely stated. The Real, the source of creation, the Noumenon underlying the appearances is an intelligent, self-directed, "self-caused" cause, a Supreme Person, which is related to the Universe as the sun is related to its rays. That which distinguishes it from the Abstract Absolute of the *Vedanta*, or the "unmoved mover" of the Greek Philosopher, is its personality and intelligence

—its combination of transcendence with immanence. The Supreme Person is beyond space and time, beyond all the categories of the human intellect. He is in them and beyond them. Limitations belong to the finite intellect of man. He is beyond all limitations. He is not an abstract Lucretian Deity sitting in the clouds, indifferent to the sufferings and sorrows of his creatures. He thinks for them, He feels for them, He condescends to be one of them when he so desires.

This does not mean anthropomorphism. In manifesting Himself in the finite, the Infinite does not cease to be. Nor does what seems to be the miraculous or the impossible lie beyond the scope of Omniscience:

Some mistake me in their search after the grand truth, the supreme goal; but those who really know call the knowledge of the One pure and simple by the name of supreme truth, which is also styled as Brahmana, Purusothama and Bhagavan (the Absolute, Supreme Soul, and God).

We may clearly see that here metaphysics is eloquently reconciled with religion.

Philosophy in Indian thought is intensely practical, having to do with the real affairs of real men, enabling its followers to live noble, purposeful, and worthy lives. This is at least the philosophy of the *Bhagavat Puranam*. Ancient India, too, like "Ancient Hellas" and "Modern Europe," had her Positivists, Pragmatists, Agnostics, Materialists, but their speculations were found to be insufficient and their systems had to be supplemented by such things as the Personalism of the *Bhagavat Puranam*, the modern name that we have given to an old philosophy. The practical nature of its teaching is clear from the following verses:

By means of intense devotion associated with knowledge touched with emotion, acquired through the study of the *Vedanta*, the attentive sages find the grand truth realized in themselves.

Oh sages, all men by discharging their own duties and discharging them well according to their stations in life please the Deity. Therefore shall all with undivided attention meditate upon, think of, talk of, and glorify the Supreme God, the Lord of satta.

Here is no sanction for caste, no necessity for an intermediary between men and God. How these later on came to be introduced is a task for the antiquarian.

The Philosopher is a man who takes a synoptic view of the Universe and lives his life accordingly; others take partial and

imperfect views of things. The perfect man is a thorough-going Personalist of the Bhagavatic type, for whom dualism does not exist in life and thought. In his conception of things all things have their places. There is nothing illusory for him. Man is not a mere sojourner on earth, his world is not a toy, he is not a mere "dance of atoms," "a thinking reed," "a developed ape," "a fallen angel." He is a finite particle, finite symbol of the Infinite Person in whom all things live, move, and have their being.

God created the Universe at the start in a creative sport as it were, the Universe with its good and evil. . . . After creating the final material world He entered it as a finite being and behaves as the Infinite in the finite. Just as one fire appears in plurality of shapes in many pieces of wood, so also the supreme soul of the Universe manifests itself in a plurality of shapes in many finite beings.

Divested of orientalism and peculiar metaphors, the meaning of these passages is clear. As if not satisfied with merely defending his own position the writer makes the very categories of Shankhya (the traditional Dualistic system which tries to account for creation with the help of twenty-five categories without recourse to the gratuitous hypothesis of a Personal God) declare their own insufficiency for the purpose of creation. They need to be supplemented by a supreme sustaining principle.

Upon the foundation of this solid metaphysics there lies a system of ethics which may be called Hindu Perfectionism. It is a system of morals aiming at the perfection of the self through dedication of the Divine.

If a system of philosophy is to be judged by its definition of Reality, its doctrines of knowledge and of time and space, its treatment of the problem of good and evil, the *Bhagava Puranam* gives us a satisfactory system. Its metaphysics with its Supreme Person as the Absolute Reality behind the phenomenal processes is conclusively a satisfactory one. Its assertion of the dignity of man as a necessary agency in the Divine process, its emphasis on the material world as merely a symbol of the Divine, recommend it equally to the thinking mind and feeling; and the wonder of the whole structure is that it has assimilated the philosophical systems of India in a rational system in which there is also place for popular superstitions and mythologies. Whatever its shortcomings, the system as a constructive effort of humanity deserves a careful study by all those who are afflicted with the malady of thought.

Calcutta, India.

R. C. Adhikary.

ALONG THE BOOKSHELF

The Open World

THE OPEN WORLD. Three Lectures on the Metaphysical Implications of Science. By *Hermann Weyl*. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1932. Pp. 84. \$1.50.

SCIENCE AND SANITY: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. By *Alfred Korzybski*. The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, distributors. The Science Press Printing Co., Lancaster, Pa. 1933. Pp. xx, 798. \$7.00 (from distributors \$5.50).

The anomaly of a mathematician addressing an audience on metaphysics and not hesitating at the mention of God is presented at the beginning of this series of Terry Lectures at Yale by Professor Weyl, now published under the title, *The Open World*. Though the title of the first lecture is *God and the Universe*, yet to the author this is no closed universe. To him the world appears more and more an open one, not closed but pointing beyond itself, and by including the transcendental we must not attempt to establish anew a closed world. There is much meat here for intellectual digestion, for Dr. Weyl is fully conscious of the revolution in thought which has been brought about by the establishment of the doctrine of relativity and the general acceptance of the quantum theory, in relation to religious affirmation and the doctrine of God. He traces the rise and development of scientific ideas, from Bruno down, which tended more and more to rule God out of the picture of the universe, and shows how the present movement of scientific thought

conduces toward the thought of God as a necessary concept.

Nor does he believe that we can go along further in a plan to rule man out of the universe as insignificant, moved by a mock and pretended humility which exalts things above persons. The affirmation of self is a metaphysical matter.

The postulation of the real ego, of the thou and of the world, is a metaphysical matter, not judgment, but an act of acknowledgment and belief. But this belief is after all the soul of all knowledge...in the transition from consciousness to reality the ego, the thou and the world rise into existence indissolubly connected and, as it were, at one stroke. (pp. 26-27)

As would be natural in a mathematician, he does not consider the harmony of the universe either mechanical or psychical but rather mathematical. Thus he founds his belief in God upon the fact that God geometrizes.

The lecture on *Causality* deals with the modern implications of the quantum theory and especially as it relates to the doctrine of freedom, where

fate as expressed in the natural laws appears to be so weakened by our analysis that only through misunderstanding can it be placed in opposition to free will. (pp. 43-44) Infinity with its hobgoblin problems of relation he moves properly out of the realm of present fact into that of hypothesis. The actual contradictions which have arisen between finite and infinite he considers to have arisen from "treating a field of constructive possibilities like a closed ensemble of objects existing in themselves." (p. 75)

When only an Eddington or a Jeans wrote in this style our materialistic friends could pooh-

pooh the matter as a sort of insanity, and declare that a single swallow does not indicate a summer, but now there are multitudinous evidences on every hand, and from the best of scientists, that the unquestioned reign of materialism is ended.

R. T. F.

Science and Sanity by Alfred Korzybski is the first volume in a series, for which around sixty titles are announced, projected by the "International non-Aristotelian Library" of which Count Korzybski is editor. Particulars as to the foundation and its sponsorship are not given, but on the jacket of the book the author quotes the favorable opinion of his work of many whose names are well-known, and who may be in part at least participants in his venture.

The book which here he brings out may be taken as a proclamation of the first principles of a new organization of human knowledge upon a basis which is mainly biological and mathematical. The author's own conception of his purpose is rather ponderously indicated by his faith that human nature may be altered to the general good by "the non-elementalistic, neuropsychological, special non-identity technique" which it is the object of his book to set forth. This looks to the eventual reform of education, and in general to the physical and moral regeneration of mankind,—whose major ills, it would appear, have issued from the "Aristotelian, infantile standards of evaluation," particularly as operating through "commercialism, militarism," etc.

Language and language habits, especially as involving speci-

ous identification and false abstraction, are the prime sources of the deceptions which a saner training would correct, as Count Korzybski sees, and in a way his primary prescription is for a training which should lift men into a critical language-consciousness and conscience. A purified sense of meaning is for him the path of salvation, and the first step toward this is the sloughing off of the type of logic which has beset thought, along with speech, since the genius of Aristotle first set us wrong.

However, it must be noted that Count Korzybski has no merely vocal-organ or speech-center conception of language. It is in the intimate structure of the nervous system itself that habits which may become linguistic are formed, and it is thither that attention must turn if we are to properly medicine the human mind. The neurological, the psychological, and the logical are all intimately interbound, as his compounding would indicate. In a way these represent planes or levels of function, with the foundational planes obscured by the very superstructures which time has formulated,—with the Aristotelian pattern as major theme. A more fundamental and, if we may judge, a more cosmic structure-sense must be found; and this can only come from a "semantics" deeper-set than is any verbal contrivance of experience. The author looks to the mathematical mode for the liberating discovery, conceiving that it is only in mathematics that we can discover the image of the community of structure between the neural organisation of thought-forms and the physical world. Every recent progress of inven-

tion and indeed of social standards he appears to regard as due to this type of thinking,—freed from the shackles of old linguistic ambiguities so ingeniously forged by Aristotle into a seeming logic of verbal entities.

With several of the contentions underlying this critique, which is worked out with great elaboration in a book of near eight hundred pages, the reviewer is in sympathy. It is entirely true that our knowledge organizes itself upon distinctive levels, and rather absurd that we should make of the single logic of verbal expression (which is only a rarefied grammar) a measure for the others,—as if an art of words could become a science of understanding. One can hardly deny that Greek thinking moved in this direction, and, especially in its post-Aristotelian developments, down into our own time. It is also a fascinating suggestion that mathematical modes, by their proven efficiencies, offer intimation of another approach to the solution of the body-mind problem by referring both physical and mental (neural and psychical) back to an anterior organization which they share. This, in fact, is precisely the meaning of the movement inaugurated by Descartes, Newton and Kant, and it is essentially Spinoza's view relieved of something of its mysticism (or "Aristotelianism," as I presume that Count Korzybski would name it). But it is only in our own day that the fuller implications of the mathematical logic are beginning to radically shape the thought of investigators, and hence to be known as "science,"—power to apply "scientific knowledge" (mathematical logic) thence becoming the measure of "sanity." It is here

that the danger lies—the danger that the discarding of the logic of speech-forms for a logic of number-forms may be no more than a flop in bed, so to speak, leading to a period of repose as one-sided as that which is abandoned. "Sanity," in the reviewer's view, is only to be preserved by a hale and aware development of all mental powers, and assuredly that of verbal discourse is one of the most significant and genuinely *poietic*. Speech springs from experience, although no experience is wholly effable, and the logic of Aristotle is a sane critique of the truths which only *logos* can convey. To supplement the Aristotelian canons of knowledge by others is a quite different affair from rejecting them; and the same will have to be said of the mathematical canons. A genuine "science" and "sanity" call for the balanced view.

Hartley Burr Alexander.

Fact, Music and Dialectic

FACT. *The Romance of Mind*. By Henry Osborne Taylor. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1932. \$1.50.

THE MUSIC OF GROWTH. By Collum. The Scholartis Press, London. 1933. Pp. 175.

DIALECTIC, or the Tactics of Thinking. By Frank Binder. The Scholartis Press, London. 1932. Pp. 299. 10sh. 6d.

Professor Henry Osborne Taylor is the well known author of *The Mediaeval Mind*; he is also a thoroughly modern man in training and sentiment. *Fact: The Romance of Mind* may be interpreted as an attempt to unite the characteristic principle not only of mediaeval, but of ancient and primitive, societies with that of today. Hence the

title of this popular but philosophical essay seems at first sight to belie its central thesis. For instead of being concerned with the "cold hard facts" in which the practical and scientific modern man believes he puts his trust, the author dips freely not only into every field of knowledge but into the deeper and dimmer currents of experience; moreover, he seeks this variety not merely for spice of illustration, but in response to his central thesis, which is that every mode of experience, every kind of value, however inarticulate, is to be taken as a serious reflection of reality. This is a view which has been lost in the successful rise of mechanism and its culmination in the skeleton world view of the machine age. But Professor Taylor is not merely interested in a return to ancient principles. Hence his insistence on the characteristically modern value, *fact*, which, however, he extends to include those subtler, but less objective, insights which mediaeval man accepted seriously. Thus:

Fact for man consists of human functioning. To recognize different processes of apprehending and constructing fact is equivalent to recognizing different kinds of facts. As some mode of human functioning is always the basis of fact, so it is of human value and verity.... So feeling or emotion may stimulate and even clarify the action of the intellect. (Pp. 125-126)

Such a broad and unusual use of the term *fact* would be hardly warranted were it not for the author's concern to avoid uncritical generalizations. For him a fact seems to be any specific and recalcitrant residuum of experience which is operative in experience. Thus he is not afraid to make significant inferences from his general theory, even

when they cut across his former habits. With regard to the mind-body problem he writes:

But my lifetime conviction of the division, to put it crassly, between body and mind has been shaken by cumulative impressions of their ceaseless inter-action. . . . I am driven to infer an indissoluble linkage between them, which in turn implies a common basis of energy. (Pp. 2-3)

This book is full of interesting suggestions.

The Music of Growth by Collum consists of a number of interesting variations on the ancient theme of music as a principle of life. The author believes with Pythagoras, Plato, and apparently Dante and Shakespeare, that in the living unity of music is a principle which illuminates not only the relationships of nature, but the subtler ties which through some unseen grace unite the human world, with its imponderable values, to the more objective Nature.

Apparently Collum believes that this principle can be adequately stated, and that he has made an advance in that direction. But one finds only the traditional equations of musical value, with truth, love, beauty, and most notably, growth. Most interesting, perhaps, is his discussion of the relation of the mathematical and the musical principles. Unlike the ancients, he accepts the popular contemporary view that mathematics is dead and that music is living. Thus he repeats Bergson's antithesis, finding in the symbol music what Bergson finds in the more general concept of duration. Collum, however, is not content with this dichotomy, for he recognizes that if life is lyric, so is nature, and so are the ma-

thematical forms which nature in its varying fancy accepts for a moment and then drops. This book is not a treatise but an essay. It is hardly scholarly, but it is certainly not casual. One could not imagine that it was written as cosmic gossip for public sale or as a contribution to knowledge for a Ph.D. degree. Even in its random attempts to solve the cosmic riddle and save civilization it breathes the breath of life.

Dialectic or The Tactics of Thinking by Frank Binder is a rambling essay which itself illustrates as well as presents the author's theory of the forms and measures of human thinking. Beneath its chatter, in itself often illuminating and thoroughly individual, there is a persistent effort to state the principles and limits of reasoning. The general attitude of the book is that of a dilettante realism in which the author appears as a mild and disillusioned Machiavelli. The chapter on "Principles of Deception" will serve as an example. Here deliberate cunning is pictured as a first principle of metaphysics, and as one which is imbedded even more deeply in thought than in physical action. This is obviously true enough in regard to our own passing civilization, with salesmanship and advertising as its touchstones, but the author points out that it is not merely the civilized who lie elaborately and ruthlessly, but even the behavioristic brutes and insensate matter. Binder is also aware of the functional basis of honesty, but he seems to have little faith in its roots, for, as he shows, honesty heightens deceit, for it is particularly incumbent upon

the wise deceiver to be as loudly honest as he is virtuous where-ever deception is not to his advantage. Thus he would not agree with Einstein's faith that "God is subtle but he is not dishonest." One must agree with Binder's facts, but in a corrupt civilization, where one must clutch at straws, the innately hopeful may take this as a sign that corruption carries the seeds of its own destruction, and may hold with Leonardo da Vinci that "Truth alone is the daughter of time." This view gains plausibility when one observes how Binder himself is frankly caught in the toils of his own best dialectic. Especially in the final chapter, "The Ironies of God," is shown how little faith the thorough dialectician can have in the tactical subtleties which he too glibly and too cleverly presents.

For we are caught so to speak in the casuistry of things, in dilemmas of sense and seeming, quandaries of right and wrong, embarrassments of body and spirit, ambiguities of faith and proof, and throughout the long length of our little day from the darkness of the cradle to the darkness of the grave we lie in duress of ignorance, immured irredeemably in the mental reservations of God. (P. 280)

Binder is too exclusively a stylist and a casuist to bring the depth of his thinking into focus, and too essentially a cynic to present a system that compels acceptance. Yet in a day of superficial and mechanical copying, these lesser values are a distinct attainment. At least he can raise philosophical questions and make them live; and in spite of his boyish egotism he possesses the rare heroic power of applying his most terrifying perceptions scrupulously to himself. He includes himself when he writes:

...for it is the first axiom of the casuist that we humans can do nothing beyond putting points and drawing lines; that however closely we examine the world we see only surfaces; that we are conscious alone of differences and similarities and that all thought begins and ends in notation. (P. 19)

H. Jeffery Smith.

Moral Laws and Moral Judgment

MORAL LAWS. By *Edgar Sheffield Brightman*. The Abingdon Press, New York. 1933. \$2.50.

THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD. By *Jean Piaget*. Translated by *Marjorie Gabain*. Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1932. Pp. lx, 2418. \$3.75.

Undoubtedly the central issue in Ethical discussion is still the question, "Is a Science of Ethics Possible?" How can universal laws be established in a field where the data must be derived from the complex of man's motives, ideals and concrete behaviour, both individual and social? What is the relative place in such a science of formal laws and principles which have their ground in obligation, and of concrete experience where the validity of those laws must meet their test? The first of these questions Edgar Brightman in *Moral Laws* answers in the affirmative. Its thesis is that ethics is a normative science of ideal principles. The second question is answered by the thesis that the basis of moral knowledge is total moral experience. Moral laws are derived from moral experience, through observation of experiences of value, obligation, law, and related experiences. Generalization from these experiences follow, then criticism, then interpretation which consists of the

two phases, *viz.*, hypothesis and systematization. The hypothesis is tested by the practical system of living and the theoretical system of laws. The system of moral laws which is presented here as new, consists of two Formal Laws, six Axiological Laws and three Personalistic Laws. The Formal Laws are: The Logical Law, and the Law of Autonomy. The Axiological laws are: The Axiological law, the Law of Consequences, The Law of the Best Possible, The Law of Specification, The Law of the Most Inclusive End, and the Law of Ideal Control. The Personalistic laws are: The Law of Individualism, The Law of Altruism, and the Law of the Ideal Personality.

Care is taken by the author to guard against misunderstanding of the system as something final, absolute and unchangeable, by defining the word "System" as a logically connected whole or body of principles; "Universal" as applicable to all cases; and "Rational" as consistent and coherent.

A chapter is then devoted to the discussion of each of these laws. The law is first stated, an attempt is made to provide logical proof, its basis in experience and history is shown, and finally the various applications of the law are discussed.

The treatment of the material is admirable and on the whole the reader is carried forward by the cogency of the argument, with only occasional mild protests. The balance between the formal and rationalistic tradition in ethics and experience, is well maintained in that experience is interpreted broadly to include the rational.

However the question still remains as to whether Dr. Brightman has successfully answered the protest of the psychological-sociological school as represented by Levy-Bruhl. Simply stated this protest is against the assumption that theoretical ethics can derive universal laws, in the light of social evolution, and the great variety of expressions of the moral life of man in time and place. The answer is as follows: "Moral law is not intended to be universal in the sense of being binding on human beings at every stage of evolution and development any more than it is binding upon apes; it is Universal for moral beings such as we know ourselves to be." (P. 49)

Thus we see that the controversy becomes a question of the definition of the word "Universal." The sociological school rejects the assumption that moral laws are Universal because it finds exceptions. The theoretical school counters by saying that it means "Universal" to apply only to those who recognize themselves to be moral beings.

So long as formal and theoretical ethics must stop at the statement of formal laws, the sociological school is justified in the charge that ethics is "*purely formal*," and hence not capable of grappling as a science should with the real problem of ethics, *viz.*, not only the question as to how moral beings ought to act, but the way in which they do act, and the principles underlying and controlling that action, so that it may become subject to improvement by the increase of motives leading to autonomous and inner control.

The fifth book resulting from the experimental work with chil-

dren of Jean Piaget and his collaborators at the Rousseau Institute in Geneva, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, is of the same high quality as its predecessors. The purpose of the present study is to find out from children themselves the nature of the moral judgment, and it is not concerned with the nature of moral behavior or sentiments. The method employed was to hold conversations with children and to present stories involving moral situations which would elicit moral judgments on their part. The experimental results are co-ordinated with the results of historico-critical or logico-sociological analysis, in which the works of such men as Durkheim, Bovet, and Lalande are used. It was found that there are two types of morality, one of constraint and heteronomy and one of co-operation and autonomy. Adult constraint combined with egocentrism leads to what is known as "moral realism," which consists of a tendency to objectify responsibility, to regard duty as heteronomous, and to observe the letter rather than the spirit of the law. Moral constraint is characterized by unilateral respect. Certain elements must be present before the child can attain to moral autonomy. Reciprocity seems to be the determining factor of autonomy. For moral autonomy appears when the mind regards as necessary an ideal that is independent of all external pressure.

A chapter on the development of the idea of justice may be summarized in a quotation:

The sense of justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by the precepts and the practical example of the adult, is largely independent of these influences, and requires nothing more for its

development than the mutual respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves. (P. 106)

The view of Durkheim that all morality is social is accepted, but the present view goes beyond him to show that the most fundamental characteristic of morality is its normative autonomy. The danger of purely sociological explanations of morality is that they tend to identify morality with reasons of state, accepted opinions, or with collective conservatism, which are the very things that the greatest reformers have attacked in the name of conscience.

The work concludes with a pedagogical application, that a choice of educational institutions which would best correspond with the psychological results of the study would be those where children are allowed to follow their pursuits in common either in organized teams or in spontaneous groupings. The procedure of the traditional school whose ideal is to prepare pupils for competitive examinations rather than for life seems to be contrary to the most obvious requirements of intellectual and moral development.

The book is an outstanding contribution not only to experimental ethics but also to educational theory.

Herbert L. Searles.

A Chapter of Italian History

THE MAN OF THE RENAISSANCE.

Four Lawgivers: Savonarola, Machiavelli, Castiglione, Aretino. By *Ralph Roeder*. The Viking Press, New York. 1933. Pp. viii, 540. \$3.50.

THE ITALIAN REFORMERS, 1534-

1564. By *Frederic C. Church*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. Pp. xii, 428. \$5.00.

LITERATURE OF THE ITALIAN

RENAISSANCE. By *Jefferson Butler Fletcher*. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1934. Pp. 347. \$3.00.

Only rarely in the progress of literature does the writing of history pass out of the realm of chronology, a mere statement of the succession of events, into what may rightly be termed history. It is history in this highest sense that has come to us from the pen of Ralph Roeder in *The Man of the Renaissance*. The unthinking will ascribe his success to his journalistic experience, a merely facile power of description, or to an urge for the human interest; but this book is all that—and much more. It is an appreciation of the relation of ideas to history, an insight into the psychological fountains from which it flows.

The epitome of the age he discovers in the careers of four men: Savonarola, Machiavelli, Castiglione, and Aretino.

Together they loom like so many lawgivers, raised by the age to answer its perplexities. In the lawlessness of Nature the Renaissance man found the retribution of its freedom; he was at the mercy of chance; and the word which resounds down the age, the obscure power which dominated and haunted his life, was Fortune. The futility of destiny made faith a necessity; and the search for it produced the prophets who proposed and passed on the torch in turn from one to another. Seeking successively to master life by spirit, by intelligence, by refinement, and by instinct, they found, each according to the truth of his temperament, their vital principles in religion, in patriotism, in society, and in self-satisfaction; and between them they exhausted the alternatives. Their lives embodied the adventures of the basic ideas that men live by; and they developed them with such transparent simplicity and extreme consistency that they live on for posterity as types. The ascetic virtue of Savonarola, the expedient virtue of Machiavelli, the convivial virtue of Castiglione, the animal virtue of Aretino—what are these but the final solutions of those who fear life,

those who accept it, those who compromise with it, and those who succumb to it?

How apropos to our own day was the insight of the young Savonarola:

"If you study philosophy and the good arts, you are considered a dreamer; if you live chastely and modestly, a fool; if you are pious, a hypocrite; if you believe in God, an imbecile; if you are charitable, effeminate."

In line with these ideas we find the power of Savonarola in that sense of detachment so necessary to any real moral leader. For out of detachment, indifference to rewards and punishments, grows the moral insight necessary to leadership, the understanding of issues, an ardor for the common good, and the great genius which Savonarola possessed of "feeling truly." Yet how easily does such a passion for moral reform succumb to egotism, as indeed it did in this case:

...his inveterate habit of simplifying every problem, reducing it to the rudimentary black and white of right and wrong, and finding moral justification for his will, had at last developed into an obsession, which clouded his judgment and was perilously akin to mania.

It would be interesting to know how many of our readers have ever in their thought connected Savonarola with Machiavelli; but the connection is there in that Machiavelli is in some sense the reaction from the puritanism of the former. The author describes the eyes of the latter as:

...black, small, deep-set and lynx-like, they penetrated sham and illusion with deadly accuracy; but they saw without seeing, their insight was cerebral, and they were without inner vision. Incapable of self-deception, he was equally incapable of faith.

Machiavelli's judgment on Savonarola failed through being the ingenuous error of the systematic cynic. He was the dupe of his own shrewdness. To him Savonarola failed through lack of material strength because he believed all armed prophets have prospered, while all unarmed ones have perished. As Savonarola based his faith in God, so did Machiavelli base his in man. He deliberately set out to put his trust in princes, and it remained to discover how they could betray him. Only time could prove to the author of *The Prince* the futility of his own philosophy.

The life of Castiglione is epitomized in his masterpiece, *The Courtier*. As Savonarola had trusted in God and Machiavelli in man, Castiglione placed his confidence in urbanity, good manners. It is no wonder that after long years of faithfulness to many masters he should be accused of betrayal by the man for whom he had manipulated and suffered most.

The coarseness, the wit, the absolute selfishness of Aretino shows also the mirror of that society and the sources of its collapse.

We can recall no work in recent years that can compare with this remarkable book in which reformers, captains, popes, and jesters stalk before us in such vivid proportions and are set in the light of such deep understandings. If one would see the history of the Italian Renaissance from the standpoint of its formative sources, he cannot afford to overlook this work.

To the average English reader, Italy of the Sixteenth Century is practically unknown, yet in its influence upon the general

course of European events, that which originated in the Italy of this time was in many ways decisive. In *The Italian Reformers*, 1534-64, by Frederic C. Church, we have a careful and scholarly account of the relation of Italian events to the remainder of Europe. It is true that intellectual movements found little official sympathy in Italy during that century, but the very efforts at repression provided the fertile soil for new and distracting ideas which found their flowering and fruiting elsewhere. The outstanding example of this was, of course, Servetus, who later found his fiery death under the unrelenting opposition of Calvin at Geneva. Another was Vergerio in connection with Poland. Though most of the happenings have a political cast, they are much more than that, and partake also of the cultural in an age that was rising to new cultural self-expression. A most valuable feature is the extensive bibliography, both of printed and unprinted sources, which will prove an invaluable aid to students of the period.

Less alert to the underlying philosophy of political movement, but more concerned with the literary evolution that ushered in the era of modern letters, Professor Fletcher marshals before us the brilliant group that comprised the heyday of Italian literary expression. After an illuminating chapter on the meaning, sources, and causes of the Renaissance comes a discriminating chapter on Dante, who is seen to strike the keynote of classical humanism in his worship of Virgil and his respect for Latinity, and this in spite of his use of Italian as the instrument of expression in his

masterpiece, *The Divine Comedy*. The main purpose of Dante's work is seen to be the separation of church and state and the revival of Italian nationalism. In this modern Italy has a marvellous advantage, since it is the fertile theme which underlies all the greatest of her literature, not even excluding that of the Empire.

Petrarca shows the further humanizing of the movement by Dante. Was not Petrarch, as our author prefers to call him, irretrievably committed to the life of a scholar and writer by the cruel act of his father in throwing the dreamy lad's books into the flames? One can imagine the heart-break of an impressionable youth when books were of such priceless rarity. Fortunately his father, catching something of the enormity of his own offence, was not too late to rescue a Virgil and a Cicero for the frantic boy. It was the task of Petrarch to humanize Dante. Dante's Beatrice is but a Mother Superior who can recognize earthly love only to turn from it as a thing unworthy or to be redeemed only in the white light of the ineffable. Petrarch's Laura is of different mold:

Laura in heaven is always the tender woman eagerly awaiting her lover. The poet's appeal to her is still a human appeal; and this no doubt is the deepest reason why the coming humanized age preferred Petrarch to Dante.

For the theology of love he substitutes its psychology. Nor is this always done without loss of value as well as dignity. There is point to Shelley's cruel comment that many of Petrarch's sonnets "begin with a sob but end with a simper."

Boccaccio represents a still further progress in the same direction, dropping to vulgarity

and smut, though Dr. Fletcher reminds us that in this he is much better than his reputation, having in mind to lampoon the weaknesses and vices of his times, and retrieving much of his coarseness with a genuine humor.

And thus in line passes that notable procession, mostly, if not strictly, Florentine, including the brilliant galaxy fostered by Lorenzo the Magnificent and some not so fostered, as Machiavelli and Castiglione, ending finally with Torquato Tasso.

This work should be read with Roeder's *Man of the Renaissance*. Less vivid in presentation, it covers a wider range and emphasizes, as its title would indicate, the more strictly literary aspect of this period; and this is done in charming style and with a high degree of scholarship, presenting many quotations from Italian literature, many of them the author's own successful translations.

R. T. F.

Renaissance Atheism and Contemporary Scholasticism

ATHEISM IN THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE. By *George T. Buckley*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1932. Pp. lx, 158. \$2.50.

THEONAS. *Conversations of a Sage*. By *Jacques Maritain*. Translation by F. J. Sheed. Sheed and Ward, New York. 1933. Pp. lx, 200. \$2.00.

Professor Gilbert Murray once wrote that an age should be judged as much by the rebels it produces as by its conformists. This is perhaps especially true of the philosophical thinkers of the English Renaissance. For in that time of intellectual ferment there was no settled orthodoxy, and creative effort came almost entirely from its various rebels.

Indeed one might say that the true philosophy of that time consisted not in the recognized doctrines of the age, but in the *sub-rosa* struggle of unorthodox ideas. Hence atheism, scorned and officially attacked, was nevertheless the most essentially characteristic expression of the individualistic freedom and secularism which is the Renaissance. Thus in his *Atheism in the English Renaissance*, George T. Buckley is dealing not with a side-issue but with a key factor in the formation of our world. For, as he clearly shows, the atheism with which he is dealing is not the hidebound mechanism of the nineteenth century, but a loose and undefined attitude including variously any kind of free unorthodox belief or practice. Thus "atheism" popularly meant in England what "radical" means in the United States today, connoting everything from free love to experimental science. In dealing with this subject Mr. Buckley has tackled a fine problem. For like the twentieth century die-hards, the sixteenth century defenders of the faith forced the questions which the atheists pursued under the surface where they flourished in darkness. Mr. Buckley solves his problem by dealing primarily not with principles but with the wealth of personalities accused or suspected of "atheism." One need only mention such giant figures as Christopher Marlowe and Sir Walter Raleigh, the former a real atheist, the latter falsely suspected of blasphemous heresies. Such men stand in striking contrast to their stodgy accusers, who, in their failure to take the ideas of their opponents seriously, and in publicizing the opinions which the suspected heretics could not themselves

broadcast, served only to promote the causes they attacked. Mr. Buckley has done an excellent piece of scholarship and has made it intensely interesting.

H. J. S.

Jacques Maritain is one of the most interesting of modern scholastics, writing now with a sharp quill and keeping the reader very much awake with clever thrust and counter-thrust as he exposes the weaknesses of modern philosophy and unsettles in the form of dialogue contemporary misunderstanding concerning freedom, humanism, relativity, the myth of progress, and the philosophy of evolution, to mention only a part.

Now and then, however, his quill is dull, since we find him growing heavy, as he shifts from direct facing of argument in the interest of an eternally clear, eternally unquestioning, and eternally settled philosophy, that of St. Thomas. This takes the pleasure out of the game for we know the answer at the start and are forbidden the privilege of discovery. We find that the corpus of our philosophy which appears so beautiful, so neat, is after all but a corpse. The fixity is that of death.

And what a disadvantage to have forever to fight everything new, every new phrasing, every new concept as if its newness were essentially and assuredly wrong because new. In Maritain's case this sets him atilt against Bergson and Einstein and the most fruitful thinkers of our times. The tragedy lies in the dismissal of that in modern thought which is sympathetic with the best of St. Thomas. It consists essentially in reject-

ing all modern implements and in the insistence that we should cultivate our field only with the tools of a past age, the bent stick and the wooden plow.

Progress and understanding arise out of appreciation and recognition rather than out of the spirit of combativeness that characterizes these essays. Still in the case of the overwrought believer in the "myth of necessary progress" they are good for the soul.

R. T. F.

Historical Studies

AMERICAN LITERATURE. A Period Anthology. *Oscar Cargill*, General Editor. 5 vols. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. \$6.50.

PETER ABAELARDS PHILOSOPHISCHEN SCHRIFTEN, II. Die Logica, "Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum," Die Glossen zu Porphyrius. Von *Bernhard Geyer*. Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munster in Westfalen. 6.50 RM.

THE BOOK OF DELIGHT. By *Joseph Ben Meir Zabara*. Translated by *Moses Hadas*. With an introduction by *Merriam Sherwood*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. Pp. xi, 203. \$3.25.

Whosoever's education has been committed to the tender mercies of what are now somewhat contemptuously known as "the gay nineties" must look with a considerable degree of wistfulness upon the unappreciated advantages of the modern generation which should make education so increasingly engaging. All this is the prologue to an appreciation of the new introduction to American Literature now made possible by this series of five anthologies. The most amazing thing is that apparently never before have we been sufficiently interested in our own literature to undertake

the task in so complete and painstaking a manner.

The first volume is entitled *The Roots of National Culture*, and covers the period from the discovery of America to 1830. Herein you will find the landmarks by which you have been accustomed to mark out the beginnings of our literary life, and you will, if you are in the reviewer's class, find many others that you did not know existed. Or at least you will find some that you knew only by name. The beauty of it is that there is a choice selection from what would otherwise be an unachievably large library, and you will no doubt find also the impulse toward many a purchase. The work shows the careful scholarship of Professor Robert Spiller of Swarthmore College.

The second volume covers the period 1830-1860, and its title is *The Romantic Triumph*. This was where the ancient texts on American Literature were accustomed to get out of pica type into the real thing. A long section is quite properly devoted to Poe, and equal ones to Emerson; while Whittier, Longfellow, Holmes, and Lowell are only less conspicuous. The development is indicated by the subtitles, ranging from the "Early Sentimentalists," through the "Transcendentalists," the "Minor Transcendentalists," the literature that has to do with the Conquest of the New World, Indian and Pioneer, Plantation and Slave, the New England literati, and the late sentimentalists such as Tuckerman, Saxe, Parsons, Read, Phoebe Cary, Foster, and Donald Grant Mitchell. Only the less important authors are grouped in classes or movements, and the work is excellent-

ly done by Tremaine McDowell of the University of Minnesota.

Louis Wann of the University of Southern California is responsible for the third volume, *The Rise of Realism*, which covers the period 1860-1888. For the present generation this volume may provide the major interest, partly because of the diversity of the material, partly because we can now offer it the calmness of maturer judgment, partly because it is rich with the forces that are still operative in our national thought, and through which so many of us have lived. The author writes:

No apology...is required for the representation in this volume of the writings and addresses of Lincoln, the songs of the Civil War, the literature of Reconstruction, the varied contributions of the Western Humorists, folk literature (cowboy ballads, mountaineer ballads, Paul Bunyan stories, and Negro songs and rhymes), and the considerable body of local-color stories and poems from various sections of the country. Much of this material may lack high literary value, but all is exceedingly important as basic material for understanding the works of acknowledged literary merit. It is also essential that the literature of recent romanticism be adequately represented if the full meaning of the struggle between "romanticism" and "realism" is to be appreciated. Hence the inclusion, on a scale somewhat greater than in most anthologies, of writers of the Genteel Tradition and producers of Romance and Sentiment. The real significance of Twain, Howells, and James is apparent only by comparison with the Aldriches, the Stoddards, the Stocktons, and the Rileys.

In this selection we have all the variety of color that is given by Walt Whitman, Songs and Ballads of the Civil War, Sidney Lanier, Stoddard, Taylor, Stedman, Aldrich, Sill, Gilder, the Western humorists, the folk literature of frontiersman, cow-

boy, lumberjack, mountaineer and Negro, Bret Harte, Joaquin Miller, Twain, Howells, Henry James, and Emily Dickinson. A large section is devoted to the South, and the Romantics and Sentimentalists are not overlooked. Dr. Wann has performed a difficult task with unusual taste and discernment.

The fourth volume will bring to his feet every muck-raker, progressive Bull-Mooser, Stand-patter, or loyal citizen who has felt underneath him the tides of social and political change, for the period is that from 1888 until the World War, and the selections are those of Professor Cargill of the University of New York. The title of the volume is significantly *The Social Revolt*, and in content it ranges from Henry George and Edward Bellamy through Garland, Hopkinson Smith, Margaret Deland, Edwin Markham, to Woodrow Wilson and George Santayana.

The new mood that has sprung from the tragedy of war is adequately set forth in the fifth and final volume of the series, *Contemporary Trends*, arranged by John Herbert Nelson of the University of Kansas. It gives what may be to some a startling reflection of our confused, questioning, and critical age. It shows how far we now are from the smug complacency of other days.

The whole series has been skilfully organized and directed by the general editor, Professor Cargill, and the very titles themselves create interest. In fact it is much more than a series presenting the important features of our literature to the students in our schools. It is a picture of American Civilization as registered in its literature, and this

presentation of it gives a graphic understanding of the moods and creativeness of American life that could be had in no other way, and which will stand for a long time to come.

R. T. F.

What more controversial character has ever appeared in the history of thought than Peter Abelard—and yet this protagonist of defeat managed to launch enterprise after enterprise, each of which was destined to triumph after his death. This was true of his conceptualism as well as of the comparative method in theology. So outstanding was his work as an educator in attracting students to his lectures, that he can almost be said to have created the University and its lecture system. Dr. Bernhard Geyer, in *Peter Abaelards Philosophischen Schriften, II*, is happily furnishing us with a new edition of Abaelard's Philosophical Writings, of which Volume Two has just appeared dealing with Abaelard's various works on Logic. What renders this volume of especial interest is that it contains the commentary on the glosses of Porphyry, that most disputed item in the history of philosophy, without an account of which no history of medieval philosophy could be written.

R. T. F.

The Book of Delight by Joseph Ben Meir Zabara, translated by Moses Hadas, published in the Columbia University Records of Civilization series, is a collection of stories, most of them traditional, by a Jewish Doctor who practiced in Barcelona during the latter half of the twelfth century. As such they form an

interesting example of the variety of ideas which that great Golden Age nourished, and they shed some light on the contact of Orient and Occident which they and their setting represent. Their mixture of wisdom is illustrated by these typical titles: "The Clever Judge," "The Hypocrite and the Churl," "The Therapy of Diet," "A Medical Catechism," "Choosing a Wife," and "The Demon Revealed." In Merriam Sherwood's excellent introduction he writes:

His name is not among the most famous of his time. . . . Nevertheless, Zabara is quite representative of that culture to which so many names of note belong. For one thing, the fact that a practicing physician in a great city should not only have written on medical subjects but should also have proved his undoubted talent in the field of pure literature, is quite in the spirit of his contemporaries.

As for the stories as such, in our high pressure age their gentle wisdom appears tame and insipid, though some will find them quaint. Some of the parables and saws are interesting, such as "A wise man is a universe." But we are much too insatiable to be wise, and too fragmentary to have, much less to be, a universe. So even here our enjoyment is somewhat indirect.

H. J. S.

The Light From Asia

BUDDHA'S TEACHINGS. Being the Sutta-Nipata or Discourse-Collection. Edited in the original Pali text with an English version facing it, by *Lord Chalmers*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Pp. xxii, 300. \$5.00.

THE VISION OF ASIA. An Interpretation of Chinese Art and Culture. By *L. Cranmer-Byng*. Farrar and Rinehart, New York. 1933. Pp. xi, 306. \$3.00.

WHITHER ASIA? A Study of Three Leaders. By *Kenneth Saunders*. The

Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 221. \$2.00.

EAST AND WEST IN RELIGION. By *S. Radhakrishnan*. George Allen and Unwin, London. Pp. 146. 4s 6d.

THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE. By *Hu Shih*. The Haskell Lectures, 1933. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pp. xi, 110. \$1.50.

The Harvard Oriental Series, now in its thirty-seventh volume, has the right to be called a Monumental Gesture for Mutual Peace and Understanding between East and West. The painstaking scholarship of this series is giving to the western world in modernized form the religious, philosophical, and literary achievements of a great and highly developed civilization. The West has been so obsessed by the practical, commercial, and industrial contacts of the East that it has for the most part remained quite unaware of the unexploited treasures of Oriental literature. And this literature has never been of easy access to western scholars. With the appearance of the Harvard Oriental Series there is now little excuse for ignorance.

The latest volume, a parallel version in Pali and English, comes from the hand of Lord Chalmers, and sets forth one of the oldest books in Buddhist literature, there being no earlier corpus of Buddhist writing than it contains. It comprises the five vaggas or books of early Buddhist teaching known as the Sutta Nipata.

The greatest barrier between East and West has been the difference of background, of thought concepts, and of language. Naturally, any literature partaking of the mystical and communicated by symbol cannot be set into another tongue with-

out great loss of meaning and even greater loss of moving power. It has been Lord Chalmers' special care to overcome in so far as possible this handicap, and his work is a real achievement. He has rendered the context into English verse and has done it so well that it is not only readable and intelligible but also impressive.

The Stoic character of Buddhist philosophy is everywhere apparent in these books, though some would call it Epicurean. The admonitions are all toward the achievement of peace, what the Greeks named *Ataraxia*, through the limitation of desire. Not until the individual reaches the Carlylean indifference of the "Everlasting Nay" can he reach true calm of spirit:

...Woes assail not him
Whose life depends on naught...

Again:

Alone! Let dainty fare
seduce thee not. With none
to keep besides thyself,
seek alms from door to door,
making no favourites.

Alone! Divest thyself
of all Five Hindrances;
banish the Lesser Faults;
shed likes and dislikes; live
th'emanipated life.

Thus perfection is achieved through contemplation and indifference to the world:

He who has learned and plumbed
all outlooks, till—beyond
all praise and blame—doubts pass,
and with Release comes calm,
—he's wholly "Erudite."

The great drawback to many translations of Indian poetry lies in the loss of poetic expression, but Lord Chalmers has been unusually happy in transferring both form and feeling into the new vehicle of English speech. With such work in the background the day of understanding comes apace.

Christopher Dawson has somewhere written, "There can be no true international world-order without an international world-culture that does not yet exist." Cranmer-Byng is performing high service in bringing to the West an interpretive knowledge of the East. His *The Vision of Asia* is a worthy companion of his other Oriental studies both in literary quality and in fine appreciation. There are many quotable passages and many that fire the imagination. The work proceeds upon the assumption of "the possibility that neither West nor East holds any more than one-half of a broken talisman which, welded together, opens on Life beyond the factory wall of civilization." (P. 1)

He also holds that the new understanding between East and West must proceed upon spiritual or religious rather than economic grounds. In fact, he sees the present fabric of civilization dissolving for want of spiritual insight.

"That which was born in time will perish in time," and a race of upstarts claiming kinship with the beasts alone will do no more than squander its worldly inheritance and vanish as the mastodon, leaving the bones of its civilization strewn along the Hudson, Thames and Seine.

With the coming of the machine age we have revolutionized our environment. It now remains to be seen whether we have the fortitude and power to revolutionize ourselves. Upon our capacity to recognize the spiritual bonds that unite us with all men depends the healing of the nations, the ending of that narrowing tribalism that now threatens world-ruin under the name of nationalism.

We who travel through the jungle of civilization, and the nightmare

of faith in dissolution, have need of vision beyond all other gifts. (P. 31)

And this particularly in an age when popular education is ninety per cent vocational and careerist and the rest is made up of ethical snippets from the Bible. (P. 24)

The only criticism of this we would make is that of recent years the ten per cent ethical snippets have been cut out.

The comparative philosophy of life of Buddha, Confucius, and Lao Tzu are treated under the parable of the three vinegar tasters, the first of whom found it bitter, the second sour, and the last one sweet. It is quite possible that his effort to keep the analogy has prevented him from doing full justice to Confucius, whose Taoism is characterized as racial, while that of Lao Tzu is a Taoism "of the life principle acting through the individual soul to the Universal and reacting through the Universal to the individual." (P. 48)

Its principle is that of finding to lose, losing the illusive to find the real, possessing all things through the supreme sacrifice of the self. If this be a fair interpretation, the philosophy of Lao Tzu is fundamentally at one with theistic Personalism. Captain Byng conceives this principle to be the mediating principle between East and West, and of a new world-order.

The hottentot is not my brother, neither the dog nor the flower is my kindred, save through a mystical apprehension of religion, which, as Havelock Ellis says, "is the art of finding our emotional relationship to the world conceived as a whole."... The war of the future will be waged, not by the contending Powers of a dying nationalism, but by the forces of self-sacrifice against the forces of self-interest. (P. 52)

This is a book that will benefit all who seek understanding. It is entrancingly written and shows a remarkable grasp of the principles and sources of world-civilization.

In the judgment of the reviewer the three greatest personalities of the present age are Gandhi, Schweitzer and Kagawa. In *Whither Asia* Kenneth Saunders sets forth with lucidity the place and meaning in the present course of civilization of two of these, Gandhi and Kagawa, since he confines his vision to Asia. To these he adds a third most influential Asiatic, Professor Hu Shih. The eyes of the western world are turning with an ever-increasing interest to events, influences and ideals that are making the Asia of tomorrow laden with such power of weal or woe for the culture of the whole world. All men of such interest will appreciate the discretion with which the author of *Whither Asia* writes.

The heroic and sacrificial struggle of Gandhi for the rehabilitation of India is truly evaluated without the over-emphasis of unthinking enthusiasm which leads to false estimates. The anomalous attempt of Hu Shih to lead the intellectualists of China to adopt the rapidly diminishing naturalism of the West just at the moment when its intellectual poverty is becoming plain to its former worshippers is striking.

There is much of power and value in the Chinese classics and it can scarcely be that these valuable elements of a great culture will be finally discarded by the people best fitted by training and outlook to profit by them.

The growing influence of Kagawa's Christian movement in Japan is interestingly and sympathetically set forth. While this section is perhaps the most interesting and illuminative section of the book, it is also the most poorly organized and illy written. The reason for this is that Dr. Saunders has apparently thought it more effective to quote directly from random speeches and papers of Kagawa, but the result is irritating and disappointing.

However, the work is of great value in bringing up to date an acquaintance with the Oriental situation.

In his four lectures entitled *East and West in Religion*, Professor Radhakrishnan probes skilfully and deeply to the heart of modern organized Christianity, raising once more the question whether there are in Christendom any Christians or whether Nietzsche's bitter words may not be true, that "there has never been but one Christian and he died on the Cross." Nevertheless Dr. Radhakrishnan's probe does not fester because it has been sterilized in love and appreciation for Christianity. Besides that he is alert to the weaknesses of Indian religions and impartial in his characterization.

Holding disinterested ground, his work should be of great value in bringing about a new appreciation between East and West. Such a result a book like this is sure to further. Moreover the work possesses a charming style and an unusual philosophical and spiritual insight. It is a spiritual diagnosis of our times by a master physician.

A thrilling story is that which is told by Professor Hu Shih in his recent book, *The Chinese Renaissance*, of the making, by himself and a group of American Chinese students, of a national language for China. In many respects his work parallels that of Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio in making the vulgar Italian the literary language of the Renaissance, thereby bringing literature to the common people. By this, though as yet only a young man, Mr. Hu has undoubtedly won an undying fame.

We wish we could be equally enthusiastic when we approach the philosophical aspects of his work. By a strange anomaly, just when Western civilization has passed the peak of self-confidence in its machines and its individualism, just when it has become conscious of the inadequacy of science to meet its profounder needs, this group of young Chinese represented by Mr. Hu declare their independence from all religion and morals and their complete confidence in the machine.

Thus machinery, invention, war even are glorified as the heralds of emancipation and civilization. If China should generally arrive at this opinion, it would be a sad day for them and for the world.

Much that is written about China gives us no enlightenment upon the present status of the Chinese mind, but this book is full of information, though small in size, and cannot be neglected. Its contents formed the substance of the Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago for 1933.

R. T. F.

Miscellaneous

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AESTHETICS AND OF THE FINE ARTS. From 1900 to 1932. Compiled and edited by *William A. Hammond*, Professor of Philosophy, emeritus, in Cornell University and Consultant in Philosophy in the Library of Congress. Published as a supplement to the May, 1933, issue of "The Philosophical Review." Revised and enlarged edition. Longmans, Green and Company. 1934. Pp. x, 205.

This work, as Professor Hammond explains in the Preface, is not intended to be an exhaustive bibliography. It has not been his purpose to select works dealing with the History of Art or the Art Criticism but to prepare an adequate survey of the literature that deals with the theoretical problems of aesthetics. This bibliography is of invaluable assistance to those interested in the subject, being very complete and extraordinarily well arranged under its various headings. It contains brief and cogent comments on works of particular significance, or such as call for a word of explanation to elucidate an obscure title. We are greatly indebted to Professor Hammond for this most useful and scholarly survey.

Geraldine Carr.

PHILOSOPHERS IN HADES, by *T. V. Smith*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1932. Pp. xvii, 229.

How can nature endow Professor Smith with so clever a wit and yet keep him from understanding how funny he himself is! In *Philosophers in Hades*, after ridiculing the thought of the Idealists making anything

out of the disjointed fragments of the early Greeks, we find him discovering his own Naturalism intact in these same fragments. It is disarming to get the jump on the opposition by ridicule, and it is clever, but not particularly convincing. But faced with his charge the author can deny that he was serious. At any rate, be you idealist or naturalist, you will get a good bit of fun out of the book, a little sound thinking, a vivid glimpse of the old philosophers, and the author's contempt for the Eighteenth Amendment — which ought to be start enough for a best seller.

R. T. F.

BURNED BOOKS: NEGLECTED CHAPTERS IN ENGLISH HISTORY AND LITERATURE. By *Charles Ripley Gillett*. Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. 2 Vols. Pp. ix, 723. \$10.00.

Today the best way to advertise a book is to plan a campaign of "blurb" regarding the book and the author, taking in such details as his favorite breakfast food or recreation. The age concerning which Gillett's *Burned Books* was written had much simpler and direct ways—they cut off the author's ears, put him in jail or pillory, burned his books in the marketplace, and made him famous over-night. Those were the days of bootlegging in books, and, outside of an occasional jail-sentence or hanging, were great days for publishers.

We have often wondered what posterity would think of some of our modern books that have been pitchforked into fame by the wiles of the advertiser, and we receive a partial answer from

the present interest and literary standing of these burned books. The literary standing is nil, and the only interest is one of wondering antiquarianism. We would like, also, to approve of the method of burning, for that brings fame to the author and relieves the glut in the market at the same time. It has the further inestimable argument in its favor that it makes the few remaining copies valuable both in the author's life-time (in case he has not hung) and afterward for the delectation of collectors. The only objection we can think of is that the system was not universal. Books which pleased the reigning monarch, or parliament, or the dominating theology, were not burned, as they should have been—at least, not until a new administration had come in. And then they were already so dead that in the case of many they were not worth burning. Those that were left form that great mass of billingsgate and invective that cursed the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and provides "research material" regarding the social and political conditions which has been the making of many a Doctor of Philosophy in America.

Gillett's work is of special value as setting aside from the

current of history the controversial movement in seventeenth and eighteenth century England. We thus have segregated for us the prime movers and the books and tracts that marked the controversies. Controversial literature is, of all, least likely to have any enduring significance, since it grows out of passion and prejudice and so is utterly lacking in judgments of men and measures. The more important it seems to the hour, the less likely it is to command the interest of future generations.

Dr. Gillett has done the scholarly world a service in going through the vast volume of material, and will save many hours of vain research by men who have need of certain information. Interesting side-lights are here and there brought out by the very nature of the work. Who now realizes the philosopher Hobbes was in the burned book class or that he was ever considered anything but a blind and fanatical upholder of the Stuarts? Who now recalls the sad and broken life of Daniel De Foe by reason of one of his political pamphlets, and that Robinson Crusoe was the reflective writing that whiled away his prison tedium? We pray for more and better burned books.

R. T. F.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Books not commented on here are reserved for more extensive review.

ADEPTS OF THE FIVE ELEMENTS. An occult Survey of Past and Future Problems, by *David Anrias*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. xv, 104. \$2.00.

The characteristic type of theosophical writing without special interest to academic philosophy.

SKRIFTER UTGIVNA AV KNUGL. Humanistiska Vetenskaps. Samfundit i Uppsala. Band 28: I. Die urgermanischen lehnwörter im finnischen von *Björn Collinder*. Pp. 253. II. *Studia Luciferiana*, von *G. Thörnell*. Pp. 34. III. En nomad och hans liv. Upptechnat och översatt av *H. Grundstrom*. Med förord av *K. B. Wiklund*. Pp. 231. IV. Psykologiska och logiska moment i Kants förnuftskritik, von *Gunnar Oxenstierna*. Pp. 104. Almquist und Wiksells, Uppsala.

A PHILOSOPHY FOR LIBERALISM. By *Bruce W. Brotherston*. The Beacon Press, Boston. Pp. 188. \$2.00.

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, edited by *Charles Hartshorne* and *Paul Weiss*. Vol. V. Pragmatism and Pragmaticism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Pp. xii, 455. \$5.00.

STORY OF NATIONS. By *Lester B. Rogers*, *Fay Adams*, and *Walker Brown*. Henry Holt and Company, New York. Pp. ix, 625. \$2.00.

GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON, PHILOSOPHER AND TEACHER. A Selection from His Writings with a Biographical Sketch. By *John Wright Buckham* and *George Malcolm Stratton*. University of California Press, Berkeley. Pp. xiii, 418. \$2.50.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE UNIVERSE. By *W. F. G. Swann*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. ix, 428. \$3.75.

THE UNKNOWN GOD. By *Alfred Noyes*. Sheed and Ward, New York. Pp. 383. \$2.50.

THE COMING AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By *George Soule*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. x, 314. \$2.50.

MIND AND NATURE. By *Hermann Weyl*. The William J. Cooper Foundation Lectures, 1933, Swarthmore College. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 100. \$1.50.

LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT: Essais et Conférences. Par *Henri Bergson*. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris.

CONSIDÉRATIONS SUR LA MARCHE DES IDÉES ET DES ÉVÈNEMENTS DANS LES TEMPS MODERNS. Tomes I and II. A. A. *Cournot*. Revu par *F. Mentré*. *Boivin et Cie*, Editeurs, Paris. Pp. xxxi, Tome I., 351; Tome II., 376.

- PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES. By *Harvey Gates Townsend*. American Book Company, Cincinnati. Pp. 252.
- YALE STUDIES IN RELIGION, Number 2: THE GOD OF ETHICAL RELIGION. By *Howard B. Jefferson*. Colgate University Press, Hamilton, New York. Pp. 30.
- DIE PERSONALISTISCHE WELTANSCHAUUNG WILLIAM STERNS. Von *Siegfried Casper*. Mit einem Porträt. John Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig. Pp. 30.
- KURZER ÜBERBLICK ÜBER DAS PERSONALISTISCHE SYSTEM. Von *William Stern*. Pp. 161-182 von PHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART IN SELBSTDARSTELLUNGEN, Band VI. Felix Meiner, Leipzig.
- GOLDSWORTHY LOWES DICKINSON. By *E. M. Forster*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. Pp. 241. \$2.50.
- THE HUNDRED NAMES: A Short Introduction to the Study of Chinese Poetry, with Illustrative Translations. By *Henry W. Hart*. University of California Press, Berkeley. Pp. 213. \$2.50.
- THE METHOD OF FREEDOM. By *Walter Lippmann*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xi, 114. \$1.50.

